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Abstract
Cognitive theories o f depression have, for years, postulated the causal role o f
attentional biases in depression. The research that has investigated this
relationship, however, has been entirely correlational. W ith the advent o f cognitive
bias modification techniques (Mathews & M acLeod, 2002) it is now possible to
modify attentional bias experimentally. This study explored potential ethical
implications o f negative attentional training and aimed to demonstrate that
attentional biases are trainable and causally linked to changes in depression
characteristics (self-esteem and dysfunctional attitudes). The first study
demonstrated that the results o f negative attentional training (using a modified dotprobe task) are not likely to last longer than 24 hours after a single session o f
training. In the second study, participants completed negative attentional training
and were administered a stress induction task. The results provide support both
'-v

for cognitive models o f depression and the diathesis-stress moc(el. That is, a
combination o f negative attentional biases and stress resulted in changés in self
esteem. The effects on self-esteem were specific to the type o f stimuli used. These
findings have important implications for both models o f depression and for the
future o f cognitive bias modification research in depression.
K ey words: Depression, Self-esteem, attentional bias, attentional training, stress
reactivity
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The Causal Role o f Attention Bias in Depressive Symptomatology
Cognitive theories o f depression postulate that cognitive biases play a causal role
in the onset and maintenance o f the disorder (e.g., Beck, 1967; Teasdale, 1988). Early
research focused on the role o f memory biases, but the literature has more recently been
expanded to include the role of negative attentional biases. A negative attentional
bias is a tendency to disproportionally allocate more attention towards negative
information than to neutral or positive stimuli.
Negative attentional biases have been found in both depression and anxiety.
One cannot, however, conclude that a causal relationship exists between
information processing biases and negative emotional experiences without
demonstrating that such biases can induce the onset or maintenance of these
emotional experiences. With the advent of techniques that can manipulate cognitive
biases through training, it has become possible to test this predicted causal
relationship. Research in anxiety symptoms, for example, has shown that it is
possible to train both positive and negative attentional biases, andythat training
negative biases can result in increased susceptibility to anxiety symptoms. In
addition, the training of positive cognitive biases has been shown to reduce levels of
anxiety and depression. However, no research has yet investigated the causal
relationship between negative attentional biases and depression.
The primary objectives of the experiments described in this thesis were to
[1) assess the ethical implications of negative attentional training; (2) explore the
size of a trainable negative interpretive bias; and, (3) ascertain whether a causal
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relationship exists between negative attentional biases and changes in depressionrelated indices such as self-esteem and dysfunctional attitudes.
The Nature o f Depression
Depression is a common and severe psychiatric disorder, affecting between
15 and 18 percent of the population (Kessler et al., 2005). The majority of sufferers
have one or more relapses and most episodes coincide with a psychological stressor.
Depression is characterized by an increase in dysphoric mood or anhedonia
(inability to experience enjoyment in things once thought pleasurable). Together
with a number of physiological and behavioural symptoms, individuals with
depression often experience low self-esteem and feelings of inadequacy. A negative
view of self is one of the most characteristic, subjective features of depression.
Individuals with depression also demonstrate a number of cognitive biases. ;
Cognitive models of depression suggest that these biases play a causal role in either
the onset or maintenance of depression (e.g., Dozois & Beck, 2008; Ingram, Miranda,
Segal, 1998). Although most cognitive theories would stipulate that^cognitive biases
\

are causally related to depression, they differ in their specific predictions on how
these biases arise and affect individuals with depression. Under Beck’s (1987)
cognitive model, stress activates latent negative schemas, which are maintained, in
part, by activated self-relevant, negative cognitive biases. In contrast, Ingram's
(1984) model would hypothesize that biases in information processing are integral
to the onset of the relationship between dysfunctional thoughts and negative mood.
However, whether these biases are causally related to the onset and maintenance of
depression or the maintenance alone is a less important distinction. What is true of
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these models is that cognitive biases (e.g., attentional bias) are not purported to be
simply a by-product of depression, but causally related to it. In addition, it is
hypothesized that these cognitive biases are related to the cognitive symptoms of
depression, particularly the low evaluation of self-worth.
A number of different types of cognitive biases are seen in depression, which
may be broadly categorized as attention, interpretive, and memory biases. Negative
attentional biases are tendencies to attend excessively to negative information (e.g.,
an individual receiving feedback on his or her performance may attend
disproportionally to the negative feedback). Interpretive biases occur when
individuals interpret ambiguous or non-negative information in a negative manner
(e.g., when an individual is told that he or she is performing adequately but

;

interprets this feedback as a criticism when it was not intended as such). This same
individual may show a negative memory bias, a tendency to selectively recall
negative events (e.g., subsequently recalling a disproportionately more negative
than positive feedback). Although, these biases may all be interrelated, and causally
\

related to depression, this particular study focuses on attentional biases. As this
review will illustrate, previous research on attentional biases in depression has
been mixed. Systematic investigation has, however, defined the characteristics of
these biases and the specific task conditions under which they occur. To understand
attentional biases in depression, it is important to contrast them with biases seen in
anxiety on which most attentional research has been conducted. The
disproportionate amount of research is likely due to the fact that early on in the
research literature, attentional biases were found more consistently in anxiety than
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in depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). With methodological modifications, however,
research has revealed similar biases in dysphoric or depressed participants (Gotlib,
Krasnoperova, Yue, & joorm ann, 2004).
The Nature of Attentional biases
A number of distinguishing features have differentiated the attentional bias
seen in depression from that seen in anxiety, most notably the latency of attentional
allocation and the nature of the stimuli to which each population attends. The time
course of attentional allocation has been linked to the nature of the attentional
biases in these populations. Anxiety disorders are often characterized by early
vigilance to threat information (i.e., orienting response), which is measurable almost
immediately after stimuli presentation (10 ms), and is frequently still maintained at
500 ms (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). In depression, biased allocation of attention does
not reliably appear before 1000ms of stimuli presentation (Gotlib et al., 2004a).
This delayed bias is hypothesized to represent a failure to disengage from negatively
valenced stimuli instead of a bias to direct attention towards them (Mogg, Bradley,
& Williams, 1995).
Mogg, et al. (1995) noted that, in contrast to depression, anxiety was
characterized by early vigilance to threat information. These researchers used the
dot-probe task, otherwise known as the probe direction task, which was modified
for use with clinical populations by MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986). In this
task, participants first see a fixation cross-centered on the computer screen. This
cross is followed by two stimuli presented on either side of the screen; these stimuli
are frequently either valenced pictures or words. After the stimuli have been
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presented for a fixed duration, they disappear and a probe appears. Participants
respond to either the location (e.g., Left or right side of the screen) or nature (e.g.,
number, shape, or colour) of the probe. This task measures spatial attentional
allocation at a specific temporal point (stimulus presentation time). Biases are
measured by comparing reaction times at different combinations of stimuli and

!

probe positions. Responses are assumed to be faster if the probe is in the same
location that the participant was previously attending. Based on this assumption,
the presence of an attentional bias towards threat is characterized by faster reaction
times to probes located on the same side of the screen as the threatening stimuli,
and slower reaction times when stimuli are presented on the opposite side of the
screen.
Mogg et al. (1995) assessed attentional bias towards depression-relevant
words (e.g., discouraged), anxiety-relevant words (e.g., cancer), positive words (e.g.,
adorable), and neutral words (e.g., preparation) using the dot-probe task.
Depressed participants showed attention biases towards depression- and anxiety\

relevant words at a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 1000 ms; in contrast, only
participants high in anxiety showed an early attention bias towards anxiety relevant
words at an SOA of 14 ms. These findings support the temporal differences in
attentional allocation hypothesized in these populations. Other studies have also
failed to find an attentional bias in depressed or dysphoric participants before
1000ms (Bradley et al., 1995; Mogg, Milliar, & Bradley, 2000; Mogg et al., 1993).
More recently, Gotlib et al. (2004a) used a pictorial, dot-probe task to assess
attentional biases in depression and generalized anxiety disorder. Sad, angry,
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happy, and neutral faces were presented for 1000 ms. As predicted, depressed
participants, without a comorbid anxiety disorder, demonstrated an attentional bias
towards sad faces but not angry faces. In contrast, participants who met criteria for
generalized anxiety disorder but not depression did not show an attentional bias
towards either sad or angry faces, at 1000 ms. Consistent results have been found in
a number of other studies (Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 2006; Gotlib et al.
2004b; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). The later onset of biased attentional allocation
supports the hypothesis that depressed individuals have difficulty disengaging from
emotionally relevant stimuli in contrast to anxiety where participants initially orient
towards threat information but disengage more rapidly. In addition to their
implications about temporal allocation of attention, the results of Gotlib et al.
(2004a) and Mogg et al. (1995) also suggest that the nature of the stimuli is ;
important.
According to the content-specificity hypothesis, participants high in
depression or anxiety show biases that are thematically consistent with their selfschemas or internal view of the world (Beck, 1967; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999;
Dozois & Beck, 2008). A number of studies have noted that anxious groups are
more likely to show early vigilance to threat information whereas depressed
participants disproportionately attend to sad or negatively valenced stimuli (Gotlib
etal. 2004a; M ogget al. 1995; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). Segal, Gemar,
Truchon, Guirguis, & Horowitz (1995) also demonstrated that the self-relevance of
stimuli was an important factor. Using an Emotional Stroop task, these authors
found that depressed participants only showed interference effects when primed
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with negative self-descriptive phrases. As such, stimuli relevance may be an
important factor in activating or maintaining participants' underling negative selfS'

schemas.
Attentional biases have not only been found in clinical populations but have
been shown to correlate with symptoms related to both anxiety and depression in
non-clinical groups. Dandeneau, Baldwin, Bassus, Sakellaropoulo, and Pruessner
(2007) measured attentional bias towards rejecting facial expressions in an
undergraduate sample. The researchers found that attentional bias towards
rejecting faces was significantly correlated with exaggerated reactivity to stress, as
measured by cortisol levels. In another study Dandeneau and Baldwin (2004) used
the Emotional Stroop task to show that individuals with low self-esteem had more
difficulty inhibiting rejection words compared to individuals with higher self
esteem.
All the studies discussed so far have demonstrated a correlational
relationship between cognitive biases and depression, anxiety, and related
symptoms. However, correlations do not prove the existence of a causal
relationship, as predicted by cognitive theories. Dearing and Gotlib (2009) found
that attentional biases were present in teens genetically and environmentally at risk
for developing depression. As this research suggests, cognitive biases may

,

represent vulnerability factors, statistically increasing an individual's likelihood of
experiencing the relevant disorder; however, without direct manipulation of these
processes, it is impossible to rule out third party factors. Due to this methodological
limitation, a new line of research has been developed known as cognitive bias
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modification [CBM). In cognitive bias modification, tasks that were originally used
' (
to measure cognitive biases are manipulated to train individuals to pay increased
attention to a particular valence of stimuli. Interpretive and attentional biases,
consistent with those seen in anxiety, have been trained and reduced using this
methodology and similar potential has been shown in the depression field.
Attention Bias Training
MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy and Holker (2002) conducted
the first study that attempted to establish the causal relationship between anxiety
and attentional allocation. These researchers recruited an undergraduate sample
with mid-range anxiety, as assessed by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI:
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Using the dot-probe task, half of the
participants were trained to pay attention to negative words whereas the other half
were trained to pay attention to neutral words. MacLeod et al. (2002) achieved this
by manipulating the dot-probe task so that the probe was always located behind the
negative word or the neutral word. The word stimuli were presented either
subliminally (20 ms followed by a mask) or supraliminally (500 ms). Results
indicated that participants did not demonstrate a bias for stimuli presented :
subliminally but they did for information presented supraliminally. After
attentional training, participants went through a stress induction task consisting of
difficult-to-solve or impossible-to-solve anagrams. Participants trained to attend to
negative words showed larger increases in anxiety after the stress induction
procedure than did those trained to attend to neutral words. This study provided a
first step towards demonstrating a causal link between attentional bias and anxiety.

However, because both groups were trained - one away and one towards negative
stimuli —it is impossible to determine what variable was responsible for the
differential responses to stress. Although the authors argued that early attention
towards negative information caused increased anxiety following stress, an
alternative explanation is that that attending to neutral stimuli improved responses
to stress.
Mathews and MacLeod (2002) conducted a series of experiments to expand
on the previous attentional training work. These authors replicated the findings of
MacLeod and colleagues (2002) in a low anxious, undergraduate sample. In another
experiment within this article, Mathews and MacLeod also investigated whether
attentional training could reduce vulnerability to anxiety. An undergraduate
sample, high in anxiety, w as divided into two groups: one trained to avoid threat
and a no training control condition, where there was no bias in probe location.
Participants were trained during eight sessions that ran ovej; a three-week period.
Contrary to previous single session findings, attentional training^effects were found
for both stimuli presented for 500 ms (supraliminally) and masked stimuli
presented for 16 ms (subliminally). The group trained to avoid threat also showed
significantly lower levels of anxiety post modification than did the control group.
Sparked by the findings of Mathews and MacLeod (2002), recent research
has investigated the ability of positive attentional training to reduce anxiety
symptoms. Wadlinger and Isaacowitz (2008) trained participants to attend to
positive or neutral words. Before and after attentional training, participants viewed
a string of negative images while being monitored by an eye tracker. Viewing this
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series of negative images was thought to be stress inducing. The researchers found
that it was possible to train a positive attentional bias. Moreover, participants paid
less attention to the negative images in the stress task following positive attentional
training than they did following neutral training. Monk et al. [2004) also
demonstrated that it was possible to train a positive attentional bias in adults and
adolescents using facial stimuli.
Building on these findings, Amir, Beard, Cobb, and Bomyea (2009) assessed
the potential for attention modification to reduce anxiety symptoms. Over the
course of eight sessions, participants with generalized anxiety disorder were trained
to attend to positive words, using the dot-probe task. Compared to a control group,
for whom there was no contingency between stimuli and probe location, the
attentional training group showed decreased anxiety. Similar results have been
found with socially anxious individuals (Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor,
2008; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). See, MacLeod, and Bridle
(2009) conducted a naturalistic study where a group of students\about to go
through a stressful life event (immigration), were either trained to attend away
from threat or completed the dot-probe task without attention training.
Participants completed 16 Internet-based attentional dot-probe sessions at home
before departing from their home country. After traveling, participants completed
the State Trait Anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970). The authors found that
the Internet training program reduced the participants' response to stress and,
importantly, the effects on anxiety persevered 24 hours after the training procedure
was completed.

11
,

Not all research on attentional training has used the modified dot-probe

paradigm to manipulate attention. Dandeneau and Baldwin (2004), for instance,
used a modified version of the face in the crowd task to train changes in attentional
allocation. In the original face in the crowd task, a matrix of emotional faces are
displayed. Participants are instructed to search through the faces to find the face of
a specified valence. For example, all but one face might be displaying angry facial
expressions and the exception would be displaying a happy facial expression. This
paradigm has been used to measure attentional biases. Hansen and Hansen (1988)
found that angry faces in a happy crowd are easier to locate than happy faces in an
angry crowd. In attentional training experiments participants are instructed to find
the smiling or happy face in a negative, neutral, or angry crowd.
Dandeneau and Baldwin (2004) used this design to train individuals to
search for smiling faces in a four by four matrix of frowning faces. A control group
searched for a particular type of flower in a matrix of flowers. The authors found
that after completing this task individuals with low self-esteem showed less
interference on the Emotional Stroop task for rejection words than did those in the
control condition. The same effects were not found for individuals with high self
esteem.
Dandeneau et al. (2007) used the same tasks in a field study with students.
These researchers found that students who underwent the positive attentional
training (searching for the positive face) over a series of sessions reported less
stress related to their final exam. In a final study Dandeneau et al. trained
telemarketers to search for the smiling face. They found that telemarketers in the
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trainirig group reported less stress and had more sales per contact than did '
individuals in the control group.
A number of studies have investigated cognitive bias modification in relation
to anxiety and stress reactivity, but far less work has been conducted in the field of
depression. Recently, two studies were conducted that used the modified dot-probe
task to reduce depressive symptoms. Wells and Beevers (2009) trained a group of
mildly- to moderately-depressed university students, over four sessions, to attend
to happy faces and positive images. In contrast to the research conducted on anxiety
and attentional bias to threat, the face and picture stimuli were presented for 3000
and 4500 ms, respectively. The longer stimuli exposure durations were selected
due to the nature of the attentional bias in depression (Gotlib et al., 2004a; Mogg &
Bradley, 2005). Compared to a control group, in which there was no contingency
between stimuli affect and probe location, the training group had significantly lower
Beck Depression Inventory scores (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) both at post
training and at a two week follow-up. Wells and Beevers concluded that attentional
training demonstrated some potential for treating depression.
Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, and Koster (2010) also recruited a dysphoric
undergraduate sample. In contrast to Wells and Beevers’ (2010) study, where two
different stimuli were presented simultaneously, stimuli were presented
individually. Participants were trained to attend to positive stimuli using 10,
Internet-based training sessions. The authors were not able to demonstrate any
change in attentional allocation, but did find a significant decrease in depressive
symptoms in the severely depressed group. In a second experiment, Baert et al.
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replicated these effects with a community sample of depressed participants. Again,
the authors were not able train a measurable level of attentional bias but did find
significant improvement in BDI-II scores compared to the control group.
Despite the promise that attentional training might have in depression, as
illustrated by Wells and Beevers (2010) and, to a lesser extent, Baert et al. (2010),
little work has been conducted in this area. Moreover, the two studies addressed
attentional training as a treatment. Although understanding the treatment
implications of attentional training is important, it is not sufficient to demonstrate a
causal link between depression and attentional biases as predicted by cognitive
theories of depression. In order to truly investigate this causal link it is important to
demonstrate that a trained negative attentional bias can cause increases in
subsequent levels of depression characteristics.

,

The aim of the proposed series of studies was to investigate, whether
negative attentional bias training, similar to what is observed in depression, is
possible. Another objective was to establish whether the effect o( negative training
\

persists over time, and the extent to which training attention towards negative
information affects levels of depression-relevant characteristics (e.g., self-esteem &
dysfunctional attitudes). This series of studies will help provide a better
understanding of the attentional training procedure and is hypothesized to
demonstrate a causal link between attentional biases and depression.
Current Studies
The primary objective of this thesis was to establish whether a causal link
exists between negative attentional biases and depressive characteristics. However,
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a pilot study was necessary to test this link ethically and effectively. One important
use of the pilot study was to develop the modified dot-probe task in order to
conduct the attentional training. Given that training negative attentional bias
consistent with depression has yet to be accomplished empirically, it was important
to gauge the efficacy of the task.
A modified dot-probe task was used in the experiment in contrast to the facein-the-crowd-task or a spatial cuing task for a number of reasons. The primary
reason was that a specific time interval of attentional allocation could be selected
and trained with the dot-probe task. Due to the importance of the SOA in
distinguishing the biases observed in anxiety and depressive disorders, it was
important that the biases be trained at specific temporal points, thereby increasing
the probability that participants would continue to attend to the stimuli rather than
initially orient towards it. The dot-probe task provides an additional advantage:
attentional biases could be trained without the conscious awareness of participants.
In the modified dot-probe paradigm, only 80% of trials in the training condition had
\

the probe appear behind the emotional face. As this pattern was not consistent, it
was unlikely that participants would consciously detect the pattern. On the other
hand, evidence from artificial grammar learning suggests that it is possible to
implicitly train patterns even if they are not consistently held (Stadler & French,
1998). Thus, using the dot-probe task permitted implicit training at a specific
temporal point.

'

To the author's knowledge, no study has ever induced a negative attentional
bias at 1000 ms; moreover, the positive attentional bias induction studies, with
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SOAs of 1000 ms and longer, have all included at least four training sessions (Baert
et al., 2010; Wells & Beevers, 2010). This pilot study was important to determine if
single session training experiments are feasible or whether multiple session training
experiments are necessary.
A stimulus presentation time of longer than 1000 ms was selected for this
study, in contrast to the shorter presentation times in previous negative attentional
training research [MacLeod et al., 2002; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). This longer
stimulus presentation is consistent with the intention to induce a bias similar to that
seen in depression rather than anxiety. Gotlib et al. (2004a) noted that the
attentional bias begins to appear in depression at 1000 ms. Gotlib and colleagues
arrived at this conclusion using a pictorial dot-probe task, similar to what was used
in the present study. Beevers and Wells (2010) used longer SOAs of 3000 ms for
their facial stimuli, and noted that longer exposure durations would give
participants more time to process the stimuli and activate congruent schemas.
Baert et al. (2010) used a stimulus exposure time of 1550 with their valenced word
stimuli. Due to the late onset of attentional bias in depression, a SOA of longer than
1000 ms, was selected. As these biases only begin to reliably appear at SOAs of 1000
ms it was deemed prudent to use a somewhat longer SOA. However, to ensure that
participants would not lose focus as a result of long exposure durations, a 1500 ms
duration was selected.
In addition to the length of exposure, the nature of the stimuli also needed
careful consideration. Both faces and word stimuli have been commonly used in
dot-probe tasks. Facial stimuli were selected in this study for a number of reasons.

x
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First, facial stimuli have more naturalistic validity than do textual stimuli (valenced
words); thus, it might be more likely that training with this type of stimuli would
generalize to real world encounters in-between experiments. Additionally, in
depression it is important that the valenced stimuli are self-relevant (Beck, 1967;
Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Dozois & Beck, 2008); negatively valenced words might
not, however, be deemed self-relevant to non-depressed controls. In contrast,
valenced facial expressions have been shown to universally induce congruent
emotion, even when exposed for relatively short durations (Wild, Erb, & Bartels,
2001). The selection of stimuli was also impacted by the other experimental
measures selected. The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS: Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988), which was used as a measure of mood in both studies uses a
number of valenced words to assess current mood. If participants were trained to
attend to negatively valenced words and similar words also appeared in the PANAS,
the validity of self-reported responses may be jeopardized. For example,
participants might be more likely endorse a word because they had seen it during
\

the dot-probe task rather than endorsing it because it accurately described their
current mood.
PilotStudy
The pilot study examined whether negative attentional biases can be trained.
For ethical reasons, participants who demonstrated had low risk for depression.
This study also provided preliminary information on whether the training of
attentional biases can induce a change in depressive symptoms without a stress
induction procedure. Due to the limited research in this area, and the inconsistency
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of the attentional training paradigm (Baert et al., 2010), this experiment was
necessary to inform what methodological choices should be implemented in
subsequent research.
Participants were screened using the depression and anxiety scales of the
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales - 21 (Dass-21: Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) to
ensure that they did not have elevated levels of symptomatology. The rationale for
limiting this study to participants low in depressive and anxious symptoms was
two-fold. First, it is probable that participants high in depression may already
exhibit a negative attentional bias toward sad faces; thus, the rate of change in their
attentional allocation to sad stimuli may be different than in non-depressed
controls. For example, if depressed participants already demonstrate a bias
towards negative stimuli, additional attentional training may not substantially alter
their reaction times as there may be a ceiling affect on the size of a possible
attentional bias. Second, increasing an individual's attentionql bias toward negative
information may make that individual more susceptible to depression. Putting a
potentially vulnerable individual at greater risk for depression would be ethically
unsound.
Findings from the interpretive bias modification literature have
demonstrated that the resultant biases can remain for periods longer than 24 hours
(Yiend, Mackintosh, & Mathews, 2005). Moreover, studies of attentional bias have
documented that the effects on stress can last for at least 24 hours (See et al., 2009).
Even though these effects have been known to persist, there is no research on
whether the biases diminish, remain the same, or increase between sessions.

18
Consistent with other types of learning effects (i.e., memory, skills training), it is
likely that these effects will also diminish with time. If this were the case then short,
single session training experiments would not be harmful to participants in the
long-term. However, it is also theoretically possible that these training effects will
remain constant or increase over time. Wells and Beevers (2010) found that
participants' BD1-II scores were even lower at a two-week follow-up then they were

)
after the final session of positive attentional training, in contrast to the controls who
demonstrated no change. This finding raises a potential ethical issue with negative
v

attentional training: It would be unethical to train negative attentional biases if
these effects persisted over time and were shown to affect mood or level of
depression. For this reason, it was important to initially conduct a multi-session
experiment, so that learned attentional bias before and after an inter-session gap
could be compared.
The final objective of this pilot was to assess whether attentional training
affects mood and level of depression in the absence of a stress task. According to
Mathews and MacLeod (2002) negative, trained attentional biases only reduce
stress tolerance and are insufficient to cause changes in mood and depression in the
absence of a stress induction procedure. However, Mathews and MacLeod did not
control for the variable of time in their studies and it is possible that the effects that
they attributed to the stress induction were actually due to the time that had
elapsed during the stress induction. A stress induction task was not planned for the
pilot experiment. Instead, after the final attentional training session, participants
i

completed a ten-minute filler task. Consequently, it is unclear whether significant
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changes in mood and dysfunctional attitudes will be found as a function of
attentional modification.

i;;

The ability to measure change in level of depression or cognitive symptoms
of depression is difficult. Depression is diagnosed predominantly based on
physiological and behavioural symptoms; symptoms such as change in appetite,
sleep, and weight. However, one would not expect to observe changes in these
symptoms over a course of minutes. Indeed, most scales designed to measure
symptoms of depression require the participant to reflect over time periods of a
week or longer. Thus, in a single session study it is difficult to measure such
changes. In addition, cognitive biases should also be most closely linked to the
cognitive symptoms of depression. As such, a mood measure (the PANAS) and
measure of dysfunctional attitudes (the DAS-SF) were included in this pilot study.
The decrease in mood is diagnostically linked to depression whereas the
dysfunctional attitude scale measures one cognitive feature that coincides with
depression.

.

, \
\

Method
Participants
The sample was comprised of 32 participants who were recruited using
posters placed around the university. To be eligible for this study, participants were
required to be fluent in English and have scored below 14 on the depression index,
and below 10 on the anxiety index, of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (DASS21; Lovibond & Lovinibond, 1995). These scores indicate that participants are in the
"normal" or "mild" range on both the anxiety and depression scales. Sixty-seven
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participants completed the screening questionnaire, 21 were ineligible due to their
scores, and the remaining 34 did not wish to participate. Of those that participated
in the study 20 were female and 12 were male. The average age of participants was
26.81 (SD = 10.75) years.
Measures
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales - 21 (DASS-21). The DASS-21 is a
shortened version of the DASS, created by Lovibond and Lovibond (1995). This
instrument has three scales (depression, anxiety, and stress) each comprised of 7
items. Only the depression and anxiety scales were used in this study. Each item is
ranked on a four-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 ("Did not apply to me at all”)
t

to 4 ("Applied to me very much, most of the time"). An example item from the
(
depression scale is, "I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all”. An
example item from the anxiety scale is, "I experienced trembling (e.g., In the hands)".
Scores on each scale can range from 0 to 28. In calculating severity ratings, scores
are doubled making the range 0 to 56. On the depression scale, scores of 0-9
indicate "normal” levels of depression, scores of 10-13 indicate "mild” levels of
depression, scores of 14-20 indicate "moderate” levels of depression, and scores
above 21 indicate either "severe” or "extremely severe" levels of depression. On the
anxiety scale, scores of 0-7 indicate "normal" levels of anxiety, scores of 8-9 indicate
"mild" levels of anxiety, scores of 10-14 indicate "moderate" levels of anxiety, and
scores 15 and above indicate either "severe" or "extremely severe" levels of anxiety.
To ensure that there was a low probability that participants were experiencing
symptoms consistent with a major depressive episode or an anxiety disorder at the

21
time of this study, such as a dysphoric or agitated state, only individuals who were
in the “normal” or "mild" range on both scales were selected. Thus, cut scores of
below 14 on the depression scale and below 10 on the anxiety scale were used.
The DASS-21 has been well validated. Both the depression and anxiety scales
exhibit high internal consistency, with Cronbach's alpha coefficients of .88 and .82,
respectively, in a general adult sample and .79 and .70 in an undergraduate sample
(Imam, 2010). The DASS-21 has also shown good convergent validity: the anxiety
scale correlates .81 with the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the depression scale
correlates .74 with the Beck Depression Inventory (Lovibond & Lovinibond, 1995;
see Dozois & Dobson, 2010, for review).
Beck Depression Inventory - II (BDI-II). The BDI-II is a 21-item measure
that assesses presence and degree of depressive symptoms consistent with the
description of major depressive disorder (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II is
the most common self-report measure used to quantify depression symptoms in
research, in adult populations. Each item is ranked using a 4-point multiple-choice
\

scale ranging from 0 to 3. An example item from the BDI would be "Sad”, in this
example 0 would correspond to "I do not feel sad” and 4 would correspond to "I am
so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it". Scores on the BDI-II range from 0 to 63.
Scores of 0-13 indicate "Minimal depression", 14-19 suggest "Mild depression", 2028 refer to "Moderate depression", and 29-63 represent "Severe depression". For
the purposes of this study, the instructions on the BDI-II were modified from
inquiring about symptoms within the past two weeks to the past day.

The BDI-II has strong empirical support for both its use in clinical (Beck et al.,
1996) and non-clinical (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998) populations. Storch,
Roberti, & Roth (2004), for example, found good internal consistency for the BDI-II
with a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .90 in an undergraduate university sample.
The BDI-II has also shown good concurrent validity in undergraduate samples.
Sprinkle et al. (2002) found that the BDI-II correlated strongly (r = .83) with the
depression module of the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV Axis I
Disorders (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997). The authors also found a testretest reliability of .96 with periods between test administrations ranging from 1 to
12 days. Carmody (2005) investigated the effect of race on BDI-II scores and
concluded that this measure was suitable for use in ethnically diverse university
communities.
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale - Short Form (DAS-SF). The DAS - SFi and
DAS - SF 2 (Beevers, Meyers, Strong, Pilkonis, & Miller, 2007) are shortened, 9-item
measures developed from the 40 item of the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale
(Weissman & Beck, 1978). Versions one and two are parallel questionnaires. Each
item is ranked on a four-point scale from 1 ("Totally agree") to 4 ("Totally disagree).
An example item from the DAS - SFi is "I am nothing if a person I love doesn’t love
me". The scale ranges from total scores of 9 to 36, with higher scores indicative of
less functional or healthy attitudes.
These shortened measures of the DAS were designed for repeated
measurement use during a single session. The DAS is a measure of dysfunctional
attitudes derived from Beck's (1967) cognitive theory of depression, and the
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condensed forms have been shown to be as reliable as the original DAS [Beavers et
al., 2007).
The original, full length DAS questionnaire exhibits high reliability and
validity in university samples. Weissman and Beck (1978) found a Cronbach alpha
coefficient of .93 and test-retest reliability of .71 in a graduate university sample.
The DAS also demonstrated good convergent validity correlating with the BDI (r =
.65) and the Profile of Mood States (r = .76). The DAS-SF was derived from the
original DAS using item response theory. The most sensitive and reliable items
were selected and distributed between the two alternative versions. The DAS
correlated .91 with DAS - SFi and .92 with the DAS - SF 2. The DAS short forms
correlated highly (r = .85) with each other. The DAS-SF has also demonstrated good
internal consistency, with the alphas of .83 and .84, for the DAS - SFi and DAS - SF 2,
respectively. The DAS-SF has good predictive validity (e.g., pretreatment scores
significantly predict post-treatment scores; Beevers, et al., 2007).
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). The PANAS (Watson et al.,
1988) contains two 10-item subscales that measure positive and negative affect.
The PANAS is one of the most commonly used measures of current mood. Each item
consists of an emotionally valenced term. For example, an item on the positive scale
is "Excited" whereas an item on the negative scale is "Distressed". Participants rate
each word in terms of how well it describes them using a scale from 1 ("Very slightly
or not at all”) to 5 ("Extremely”). The total score on each scale (positive and
negative) can range from 5 to 50. Although instructional variants are frequent, the
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current study asked participants to respond to questions based on their current
mood state.
The PANAS was developed based on the theory that positive and negative
affect consist of two distinct dimensions, and thus need to be measured separately.
Watson et al., (1988) investigated the reliability of the PANAS in an undergraduate
sample. Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the positive and negative affect scales,
under current mood instructions, was .89 and .85. Watson et al. (1988) also
investigated the convergent validity demonstrating that the negative scales
correlated .56 to .58 with the BDI, depending on the instructional variant. The
negative scale of the PANAS also correlated .65 to .74 with the Hopkins Symptom
Checklist, depending on which time frame was used in the instructions.
Facial Stimuli. The facial stimuli used for this task consisted of 24
monochromatic, facial images (see Figure 1). Half of the images featured a Caucasian
face and half a Hispanic face; in addition, half of the faces were female and half male.
Each of the 12 models was depicted twice: once with a sad expression and once with
a neutral expression. These images were all adopted from the Montreal Set of Facial
displays of Emotion (MSFDE: Beaupre & Hess, 2005). All expressions have been
coded using the facial action coding system to ensure that all faces displayed
identical expressions across actors. Thibault, Bourgeois, and Hess (2006) found that
participants correctly identified the emotion displayed 85 percent of the time.
Dot-probe task. The dot-probe task was presented to participants using a
Pentium D, Bolen computer and displayed on a 17-inch monitor. The facial stimuli
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Figure 1. Example of facial stimuli used in the dot-probe task.
Neutral

Negative
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were approximately 9 x 10 cm and were placed approximately 12 cm apart.
Assuming that participants were viewing the image from 50 cm away, the facial
' L
stimuli would have been presented at a visual angle of 3.5 degrees and were
separated by a visual angle of 4.2 degrees. All stimuli and probes were presented on
a black background.
Each trial began with a light grey fixation cross in the center of the screen,
which was presented for 1000 ms. This image then disappeared and was replaced
by two facial images, positioned on the right and left sides of the screen. One face
always displayed a sad expression and the other displayed a neutral expression.
The facial stimuli were presented for 1500 ms. After the facial images disappeared,
a probe appeared on the left or right side of the screen. The probe was comprised of
v.

.

either one or two, light grey asterisks, and participants were asked to identify the
number of asterisks by pressing the, "z" key to indicate one or the, "/" key to
indicate two. The probe disappeared once a response was made.
In the attentional training condition, 80 percent of all probes were located in
\

the same spatial location as the image displaying a sad expression. In the remaining
20 percent of trials the probes appeared in the same location as the neutral face. In
the control condition the probes were equally likely to appear behind the neutral
faces as the sad face.
The dot-probe task consisted of 6 blocks each approximately six-minutes in
duration. Each block was separated by an optional two-minute break. Participants'
accuracy and reaction time results were displayed to provide incentives for their
continued effort. The length of each trial was broken down into three components: a

27
1000 ms fixation cross, a 1500 stimulus exposure, and a reaction time
[approximately 500 ms in duration). In total this task took approximately.40 min,
and 720 trials were presented.
Procedure
Before enrolment in the study, participants were screened using the
depression and anxiety scales from the DASS-21, administered via an Internet
questionatire. Volunteers whose scores indicated that they had moderate to severe
anxiety or depression were excluded from this study. Eligible participants were
sent an email informing them they had met criteria and how they should proceed if
they were interested in participating. Consenting participants were asked to commit
to one hour of testing, on two sequential days (see Appendix A for the letter of
information and Appendix B for the consent form). Volunteers who did not meet
study criteria were sent an email informing them that they did not meet inclusion
criteria because their scores indicated that they might have been experiencing low
mood or some worry. Participants were clearly informed that the test they had
taken was applicable only for research purposes and was not diagnostic of any ;
mental or emotional distress. Participants were nonetheless provided with a list of
self-help resources, available mental health resources, and mental health
community contacts.
On the first day of testing, participants were asked to complete a consent
form. Participants then completed a series of questionnaires that included the BDIII, the DAS-SF, and the PANAS, (the DAS-SF has alternative forms, and the order of
presentation was counterbalanced). The BDI-II was completed first and scored
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while participants completed the remainder of the measures. Due to ethical
concerns, participants who scored 20 or higher on the BDI-II were placed into the
control condition, and their data was withdrawn from the study. Participants who
scored bellow a 20 on the BDI-II were randomly assigned to either the training or to
the control condition.
: ,

After completing the questionnaires, participants were administered the dot-

probe task. Following this task, participants completed the PANAS and the alternate
version of the DAS-SF. Participants were then thanked for their time and reminded
to return the next day.
When participants arrived the next day for their second session, they began
by completing the PANAS and the DAS-SF. After completing these questionnaires,
participants began the second session of the dot-probe task. Once participants
finished the dot-probe task, they completed a filler task and then another set of
questionnaires [the BDI-II, the PANAS and the alternative form of the DAS-SF).
Participants were then thanked and debriefed [see Appendix C for debriefing form).
Participants were also reimbursed for their time and expenses and given ten dollars
for each session they participated in [for a total of twenty dollars).
Results and Discussion
Participant Characteristics. There were eight females and eight males in
the training condition and thirteen females and four males in the control condition.
The average age of participants in the training condition and control condition was
26.41 [SD = 6.10) and 27.25 (SD = 14.77), respectively. The training group (M =
9.89, SD = 5.73) exhibited significantly higher initial levels of depressive symptoms
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(BDI-II scores) than did the control group (M = 4.69, SD = 4.24), t(32) = 2.72, p < .01.
This group difference, coupled with the fact that individuals with depression tend to
have negative attentional biases, renders the results of the attentional training
difficult to interpret. For instance, any bias found toward negative stimuli may not
be due to the training condition per se but to an already present negative bias. Thus,
the results of attentional training must be interpreted cautiously.
Dot-probe Task. Data from the dot-probe task were analyzed by calculating
each participant's average reaction times to asterisks that appeared behind neutral
and negative stimuli. The mean reaction time to respond to probes located behind
negative faces was 521 (SD = 48) ms for participants in the training condition. These
individuals took on average 535 (SD = 45) ms to respond to probes located behind
neutral faces. Participants in the control condition had average reaction time of 576

(SD = 107) ms and 574 (SD = 108) ms to respond to probes behind the negative and
neutral faces, respectively. A 2 stimulus (negative, neutral) x 2 condition (training,
\

control) mixed ANOVA was conducted. The interaction between stimulus and
condition was marginally significant, F( 1, 31) = 3.71, p = .06. This finding suggests
that participants in the training condition had a bias towards negative stimuli;
however, it is unclear whether this stemmed from the training condition or
J

'

represents a preexisting bias. Thus, no definitive conclusions may be drawn from
these findings. However, these results are not inconsistent with the idea that
training had taken place. Given that there was a significant trend in the data, this
task was used again, with slight modifications, in the main study.

30
The primary aim of the pilot study was to assess whether the effects of
attentional training persevere on the second day of testing. Given its exploratory
nature, this pilot study had limited power to draw definitive conclusions. This
limitation notwithstanding, the trend in the data seems to indicate that the effects of
training were not persistent over time. As visible in Figure 2 and 3, no preference
was observed for negative faces in the first block on Day 2 as compared to in the last
block on Day 1. Although none of the trials were statistically different from one
another, the numerical trend suggests that the training effects did not persist on the
second day. While acknowledging that these results are preliminary, the transient
nature of attentional biases suggests that there are no significant ethical concerns
with the use of negative attentional training.
A second objective of this pilot study was to assess whether attentional
training causes changes in mood or dysfunctional attitudes in the absence of a stress
task. To investigate whether the passage of time was sufficient to observe changes
in mood and dysfunctional attitudes, changes in the PANAS and DAS-SF were
investigated. The means and standard deviations of these scores are presented in
Table 1.
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). Since the PANAS is divided
into two scales (a positive and a negative scale), two ANOVAs were conducted to
assess the effects of training on mood. Each mixed ANOVA was comprised of a 4
time (1, 2, 3, and 4) by 2 condition (training and control). The interaction between
condition and time was not significant for the negative, F(3, 31) = 0.48, p = .66, or

Figure 2

Degree o f bias observed per trial on Day 1. Degree o f bias was computed as
the average difference between each participant’s reaction time to probes
behind neutral versus negative faces. Thus, positive scores indicate a negative
attentional bias.
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Figure d . Degree o f bias observed per trial on Day 2. Degree o f bias was computed as
the average difference between each participant’s reaction time to probes
behind neutral versus negative faces. Thus, positive scores indicate a negative
attcntional bias.
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Table 1

Mean Difference and Standard Deviations on Mood and Dysfunctional Attitudes

Training____________________Control

Time 1

Time 2

.

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

PANAS- Positive

28.00

12.71

35.88

7.33

PANAS-Negative

12.35

4.92

12.23

3.40

DAS-SF

11.76

5.37

9.71

3.85

PANAS- Positive

27.82

12.67

26.82

14.22

, PANAS-Negative

13.41

4.58

9.65

4.55

11.29

3.80

7.88

4.04

PANAS- Positive

25.88

12.15

33.53

8.55

PANAS-Negative

12.71

6.55

11.71

4.04

DAS-SF

10.71

4.45

DAS-SF
\

Time 3

Time 4

3.16

9.47
\

.

...

PANAS- Positive

25.12

13.11

31.35

9.57

PANAS-Negative

13.65

6.73

11.53

3.76

DAS-SF

11.94

4.22

7.82

4.05

Note. PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale; DAS-SF = Dysfunctional Attitude Scale - Short
Form.
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positive, F(3, 31) = 1.49 , p = .23, scales of the PANAS. There were also no main
effects of time (positive: F[3, 31] = 1.78, p = .16, negative: F[3, 32] = 444, p = .78). No
main effect of condition was found for either the positive, F(3, 31) = 3.07, p = .09, or
the negative, F(3, 31) = 1.87, p = .18, scales. These results suggest that there was no
significant change in mood over time and that the training condition did not result
in a significant change in mood.
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale - Short Form (DAS-SF). A similar 4 time (1,
2 ,3, and 4) by 2 condition (training and control) mixed ANOVA was conducted on
the DAS-SF data. There was no significant interaction between condition and time,
F(3, 32) = 2.06, p = .13, and no main effect of time, F(3, 32) = 1.15, p = .33. As such,
there was no significant change in dysfunctional attitudes over time. There was a
main effect of condition F (l, 32) = 5.14, p = .03, as would be expected because the
two groups were significantly different on BDI-II scores. Group differences
disappeared, for example, when BDI-II scores are added into The model as a
covariate, F (l, 32) = 2.66, p = .12. Although there was insufficient1statistical power
\

in this pilot study to draw definitive conclusions, the extant data suggest that the
passage of time combined with the training task was unlikely to have caused the
observed changes. Thus, an additional time control group, where a filler task would
be used instead of a stress task, was not determined necessary in the subsequent
study.
Study 1
The results of the pilot study established that the training effects were
unlikely to last over 24 hours, thus indicating that it would not be ethically
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problematic to use this training in single session experiments. The findings from the
pilot also suggested that the combination of negative attentional training and time
alone are insufficient to cause changes in mood or dysfunctional thoughts. These
findings informed the design of the current study.
The main goal of this study was to establish that attentional training is
possible and causally related to changes in characteristics of depression. The
diathesis-stress model suggests that certain individuals are vulnerable to
depression but that this alone is insufficient to evoke the onset of an episode. The
model predicts that depressive episodes arise when vulnerability is combined with
a stressful life event. Consistent with this conceptualization, Mathews and MacLeod
(2002) argued that a stressor is necessary to observe the emotional effects of
cognitive training. It was hypothesized that attentional training alone would be
unlikely to cause changes in mood or self-esteem; however, shifts in mood and self
esteem following the combination of attentional training and stress were purported.
There are many types of experimental stressors, but the task usecl by Mathews and
MacLeod was adopted for this study.
As discussed previously, direct measures of depression are predominantly
symptom based and would therefore not be sensitive enough to within session
manipulations. As with the pilot study, the dysfunctional attitude scale was used to
measure changes in attitudes toward self. However, dysfunctional attitudes are also
thought to represent more stable characteristics and may not be sensitive to change.
It might also be the case that attentional biases and dysfunctional attitudes are both

additive vulnerability factors and not causally related. As such, ancillary indices of
depression were also introduced.
Self-esteem was used as an indicator of cognitive characteristics of
depression. As discussed earlier, one consistent cognitive characteristic of
depression is an experience of low self-worth, which is related diagnostically to this
condition. Self-esteem is also highly correlated with measures of depression
(Kazdin, French, Unis Esveldt-Dawson, & Sherick, 1983; Tennen & Herzberger,
1987) and is conceptually linked to self-schemas (e.g., a negative self-image that
characterizes depression). An explicit and an implicit measure of self-esteem were
used in this study.
The literature on implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem suggests that
they are correlated but not highly so. It may be possible that one type of self-esteem
would be more affected by the training task than the other. The measures also have
-
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their own advantages. Implicit self-esteem is less affected by demand
characteristics than explicit measures, but explicit measures have higher face
validity and stronger psychometric properties. For example implicit measures have
much lower retest reliability and internal consistency. The State Self-esteem Scale
(SSES; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) was used to measure explicit self-esteem because
it was designed to measure within-session changes and contains different domains
(performance, social, and appearance), thereby permitting the assessment of
specificity of training on different domains of self-esteem. Just as cognitive biases
may be content specific so may be the effects of such biases. Thus, for example, if

«
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the training stimuli were social in nature the effects may be specific to the social
domain of the SSES. The effects also may be less specific to the stimuli but more
contingent on the type of stressor. For example, if the stressor challenged an
individual's physical self-image [e.g., it was suggested to participants that they were
unattractive), the affects may be specific to the appearance domain of the SSES.
In the pilot study an index of mood, the PANAS, was used as a proxy of
depression. However, there was some question as to whether the attentional
training task would cause a change in mood on its own, in the absence of a stressor.
Valenced facial expressions have been shown to universally induce congruent
emotions, even when exposed for relatively short durations [Wild et al., 2001). If
participants in the negative training condition spent more time attending to and
thus viewing negative faces than did individuals in the control condition, this may
induce a change in mood. To ensure changes in mood were not caused solely by the
attentional training, the PANAS was administered before andafter the dot-probe
task but before any stress induction procedure.

\

Method
Participants
Participants in this study were recruited using two methods. Fifty-five
participants were recruited through the undergraduate participant pool. These
participants received course credit for their participation. Fifty-three other
individuals were recruited using posters placed around campus at the University of
Western Ontario. These participants were each compensated 15 dollars for their
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time. To be eligible for the study; participants had to be fluent in English and to
have scored below 20 on the BDI-II. This score indicates that participants were
either in the "minimal" or "mild" range on the BDI-II. Eighteen participants were
excluded from this study for not meeting this criteria. In total, 108 participants
were recruited for this study (63 female, 45 male). Participants ranged in age from
17-63 years (M = 21.43 SD = 6.19). A total of 54 participants were assigned to each
condition.
Measures
Many of the measures used in the pilot study (e.g., BDI-II, PANAS, DAS-SF)
were also used in this study. Two new questionnaires were used in the present
study to assess implicit and explicit self-esteem: the Name Letter Task (Nuttin,
1985,1987) and the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).
Name Letter Task (NLT). The Name Letter Task (Nuttin, 1985,1987) was
used to measure implicit self-esteem (see Appendix D). In this ta&k, participants rate
letters of the alphabet using a Likert-type scale. The task is based on the premise
that individuals with higher self-esteem will like their own initials more than other
letters of the alphabet. Slight variations in instructions and range of the scale exist
across published descriptions of the NLT. The range varies from a 5-point to a 9point scale across different published studies. A 7-point Likert-type scale was
selected for this study based on Krause (2010) because it represented a mid-point
in the range of scales used and was commonly used in previous research. There are
also instructional variants of the task. For example, some researchers ask
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participants to rate how beautiful the letters are (Koole, Dijksterhuis, van
Knippenberg, 2001] whereas others ask participants to rate how much they like
each letter (for a review see Stieger, Voracek, & Formann, 2011). The majority of
published work uses the second instructional variant, which was incorporated in to
this study. Thus, participants were asked to rank each letter on a scale from 1 ("Not
Like") to 7 ("Like A Lot").
The NLT has been used as an implicit measure of self-esteem across a
number of different studies. The NLT tends to not to be affected by impression
management yet correlates significantly with global self-esteem (Gebauer, Riketta,
Broemer, & Maio, 2008). Krause, Back, Egloff, and Schmukle (2009) found a testretest reliability of .50 for the NLT task over a four-week period. The NLT correlates
positively with the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (r = .21; Krause et al., 2010) and
negatively (r =-.29) with the BDI-II (Gebauer et al., 2008)
'v

The State Self-esteem Scale (SSES). The SSES is a 20-item modified Likerttype scale designed to measure state self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). The
SSES was designed particularly to detectchanges in different domains of self-esteem
(performance, social, and appearance) following experimental manipulations. Thus,
the SSES has three subscales. Each item is rated from 1 ("Not at all") to 5
("Extremely") based on how true the participant believes the statement is right now.
An example item from the performance scale is "I feel confident about my abilities”;
an item from the social scale is "I am worried about what other people think of me".
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The SSES has been well validated both as a global state self-esteem measure
and as a measure of domain specific self-esteem. Heatherton and Polivy (1991)
demonstrated quite high internal consistency [a = .92) in the SESS. The SSES
correlates highly with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (r = .72) and with the Beck
Depression Inventory (r = - .71). Heatherton and Polivy also found that themespecific stressors primarily affected their related subscales. For example, when
students were given academic stressors (poor results on a midterm) their
performance subscale was most affected.
Anagram Stimuli. Stimuli used for the anagram task were taken directly
from related unpublished work (Ouimet, 2007). The stimuli consisted of 40
different letter strings (see Appendix E). Of these 40 letter strings, 20 could not be
rearranged to create real words in the English language. An online anagram tool
(http://www.wordsmvth.net/live/home.php?content=anagram) was used to
ensure there were no possible solutions to the 20 anagrams that were supposed to
\
be unsolvable. An example of an unsolvable string was "ITWHEG". The other 20
letter strings were solvable but extremely difficult, as rated by a fourth-year,
undergraduate student. For example the letter string, "TAHEREN" could be
rearranged to spell the word "HEARTEN".
Anagram Task. The Anagram task used in this study was modeled after
Mathew and MacLeod (2002). Participants read computer-displayed instructions,
which informed them that the purpose of this task was to assess the relationship
between performance on the dot-probe task and the ability to solve anagrams.
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Participants were also informed that previous research had shown a relationship
between anagram completion and intelligence. They were also told that they would
be asked to rearrange a string of letters to form a word and were given specific
instructions on how to respond. They were also informed that they would be
videotaped during the task and that their footage would be displayed to their peers
as an example of a good (if they scored in the top 10 percent) or poor (if they scored
v

in the bottom 10 percent) performance. An external webcam (a DYNEX PC Camera,
Model #DX-WC100) was attached to the computer and placed at keyboard level on
the left side of the monitor. The camera was connected to the computer and a green
light was displayed above the lens suggesting it was on and recording.
Once participants read the instructions, they began the Anagram task. Each
word was presented in the upper right hand corner of the screen at a height of one
centimeter and a visual angle of .02 degrees. All the letters in each word string were
displayed in a unique, random order. Displayed beneath the letter strings were two,
grey boxes, organized in a vertical line. Directly to the right of the first box was the
word "YES" and directly to the right of the second box was the word "NO". If
participants felt they had solved the anagram they were to click on the grey box next
to the word "YES". Once they responded in this manner, a pop-up text box appeared
for them to type the word into. Once they had typed their guess, participants could
either press enter to move on to the next anagram or click on the "X" in the upper
right hand corner of the text box to close the text box and return to the original
anagram screen. Participants clicked the "NO" button if they felt as though they
could not solve the anagram. The screen would then change to display a new letter
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string. At the bottom of every screen was a numerical three-minute counter that
displayed the time left to complete the task. Once three minutes had elapsed, a pop
up box appeared on the screen informing participants that their time had expired. A
new screen then appeared informing participants that their performance was
unusually poor and that their video recording had been selected to be shown in a
class demonstration of poor performance.
Dot-probe Task. The dot-probe task was nearly identical to the one used in
the pilot study with one modification. In order to ensure that the entire experiment
could be completed in an hour the dot-probe task was shortened. Instead of 120
trials per block there were 96, thus in total there was 576 trials. This allowed the
entire task to take approximately 35 minutes.
Procedure/.
Upon starting the experiment, participants were asked to provide informed,
written consent (see Appendix F and G). Participants then completed a paper and
pencil version of the PANAS. Participants were then administered a computerized
version of the BDI-II. Participants, who scored below 20 on the BDI-II, were
assigned to the negative training or the control condition. If they scored 20 or
above, participants were placed into another experiment not addressed here.
After participants completed the dot-probe task, they were given a packet of
questionnaires that contained the PANAS, NLT, SSES, and DAS-SF (version one or
two). Participants were always given these questionnaires in the same order;
however, which version of the DAS-SF was used first was counterbalanced across
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participants. Participants began the anagram task following the administration of
the questionnaires. Once participants had finished the anagram task, and read their
feedback, they were given a final package of questionnaires, which included the
NLT, SESS, and the alternate version of the DAS-SF. Participants were then thanked
for their participation and debriefed (see Appendix H). After being debriefed about
the anagram tasks, participants signed a new consent form (see Appendix I)
indicating that they understood that deception had occurred and that they were still
willing to allow their responses to be used for research purposes. In total, this
experiment took approximately one hour.

>

Results
Participant Characteristics. One hundred eight participants were in this
study, with 54 in each condition. There was an equal number of paid participants in
each condition, %2(1,108) = .07, p = .79. There were 22 males and 32 females in the
training condition. The mean age of participants was 22.54 (SD =^7.84) and
participant's ages ranged from 17 to 63. There were 23 males and 31 females in the
control condition. The mean age of participants was 20.20 (SD = 3.23) and
participant's ages ranged from 17 to 30. The mean initial BDI-1I scores was 8.41 (SD
= 7.74) for the control group and 8.00 (SD = 7.70) for the training group. This
difference between groups was not statistically significant, t(106) = -0.46, p = .64.
Preliminary analysis was conducted to ensure there were no significant gender
differences. ;
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Attentional Bias Training. Each participant's mean reaction time to stimuli
located behind neutral and negative faces was calculated. In order to assess if
attentional training had occurred, a 2 condition (training, control] by 2 stimulus
type (negative, neutral) mixed ANOVA was conducted. The interaction between
stimulus type and condition was significant, F (1,106) = 15.93, p < .001 (for means,
see Table 2). This finding indicates that the training group demonstrated an
attentional bias towards the negative faces in comparison to the control group.
Posthoc analysis revealed that the training group was significantly faster at
responding negative stimuli, t(54) = 3.59, p = .02. In contrast the control group was
not significantly faster at responding to negative or neutral faces, t(54) = -1.09, p <
.56.
To calculate the size of the attentional bias, the speed at which participants
responded to probes (behind the emotional face or neutral face) was recorded. The
difference between each participant's mean reaction time was averaged over each
condition, providing the average discrepancy in reaction time to neutral versus
\
negative faces. The size of the attentional bias was computed as the difference
between the groups' average discrepancies in reaction times. Based on this
calculation, there was a 95% chance that the size of the attentional bias was
somewhere between a 10 and 20ms (i.e., approximately 15ms).
Positive and Negative Affect Scale. The PANAS was administered
both before and after the dot-probe task. Difference scores (time 1 minus time 2)
are presented in Table 3. To investigate changes in mood, independent t-tests were
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Table 2
Average Reaction Times (ms) toward Negative or Neutral Stimuli as a function of
Training

Training

Control

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Neutral Stimuli

562

80

574

10

Negative Stimuli

550

70

581

11

-

Note: Ail means and standard deviations are measured in ms.

V
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Table 3

Mean Difference and Standard deviations of Measures__________.
Training

_____________Control

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

PANAS- Positive

0.49

2.74

0.87

2.80

PANAS-Negative

6.02

5.93

5.19

0.80

NLT

0.92

1.91

0.45

2.22

SESS Total

5.85

9.35

2.33

7.23

SSES Performance

3.69

5.13

2.65

4.47

SSES Social

1.54

3.73

-0.14

3.40

SSES Appearance

0.63

2.54

0.16

1.96

DAS-SF

0. 65

5.51

-0.76

5.80

Note. PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale, NLT = Name Letter Task, SSES = State Self-Esteem
Scale, and DAS-SF = Dysfunctional Attitude Scale-Short Form ,

\
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conducted between the training and control group, on the difference scores for both
the positive and negative PANAS scales. Group differences were not significant for
either the positive, t(106) = -0.70, p = .49, or negative, t(106) = 0.89, p = .38, scales.
Thus, the training condition of the dot-probe task did not appear to independently
cause any change in self-reported mood.

Name Letter Task. The Name Letter task was used to assess the impact of
attentional training on implicit self-esteem. Total scores were calculated using the
ipsatized correction. In the ipsatized correction a difference score is calculated
between the individuals' average ranking of their initial letters and the average
score that other participants, who did not share the same initials, gave those letters.
From this difference score the average rating that the individual gave to all non
initial letters was subtracted, giving the corrected Name Letter Task total score.
Using these corrected scores, time 1 minus time 2 differences scores were calculated
for both groups and can be found, along with the respective standard deviations, in
Table 3. An independent t-test, conducted on the difference scores between the two
conditions, was not significant, t(104) = 1.17, p = .24. Although this test did not
reach significance the means were in the direction that would be predicted. A '
further exploratory series of t-tests were conducted to assess whether a significant
change had occurred within groups. Two single sample t-tests were conducted to
assess if changes in the NLT were significantly different than zero. There was no
significant difference in the control group, t(104) = 1.45, p = .14. The training group,
however, demonstrated a significant change in implicit self-esteem, t(104) = 3.52, p
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< .001. In other words, participants in the training group showed a decrease in
implicit self-esteem. The effect size of this difference was, however, small (d = 0.23).
State Self-esteem Scale. The SSES has both a total score and three subscale
scores (performance, self-esteem, and appearance) that can be analyzed. Difference
scores of time 1 less time 2 were calculated and their means and standard
deviations are located in Table 3. Independent t-tests were conducted on the
difference scores for the total scale and each of the subscales to test whether
changes in explicit self-esteem were significant and in which domain these
differences lay. The first independent t-test conducted on the total score of the SSES
was statistically significant, t('106) = 2.19, p < .05, suggesting that the training task
affected state self-esteem. Thus, participants in the training group showed a larger
decrease in self-esteem after the stress task, than did those in the control group.
Although the means were in the predicted direction, there was no significant
difference between groups on both the performance, t(106) - 1.32, p = .19, or
appearance, t(106) = 1.23, p = .22, domains of self-esteem. However, there was a
significant difference between groups on the social self-esteem, t('106) = 2.56, p <
.05. These findings suggest that the dot-probe training task may primarily affect
social self-esteem, and cause the greatest decrease in self-esteem there.
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale - Short Form. The DAS-SF was administered
to assess for the effects of training on dysfunctional attitudes related to depression.
Mean difference scores (time 1 minus time 2) and their associated standard
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deviations are located in Table 3. The difference between groups was not
statistically significant, t(106) = 1.29, p = .20.
Discussion
The current thesis had a number of objectives that were met by conducting
two studies. The pilot study assessed the ethical implications of negative attentional
training. The findings suggested that trained negative attentional biases were
unlikely to last over 24 hours and were, therefore, not problematic to conduct from
an ethical stand point. Study 1 explored whether training a negative attentional bias
was possible and examined the temporal size of such an effect. However, the
primary aim of this study was to ascertain whether a causal relationship could exist
between negative attentional biases and changes in depression characteristics (such
as self-esteem and dysfunctional attitudes). Consistent with this objective, the
specificity and generalizability of the resultant effects were also explored.
'■ N

The results of Study 1 revealed that the attentional training paradigm was
effective at training participants to disproportionally attend to negative faces. Thus,
participants in the training condition attended more to the negative stimuli and less
to the neutral stimuli as measured by their reaction times in the dot-probe task.
These results imply that it is possible to train negative attentional biases consistent
with what might be exhibited by individuals with depression. The size of the
attentional bias was approximately 15 ms, which is consistent with the findings
from MacLeod et al. (2002) who trained negative attention biases in anxiety.
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After establishing that training could induce negative attentional biases
consistent with those seen in depression, the next step was to establish if these
biases could cause changes in self-esteem and/or dysfunctional attitudes (which
served as indirect indicators of depression). Congruent with the diathesis- stress
model of depression, it was hypothesized that the combination negative attentional
bias and a stressor would be necessary (rather than either variable alone) to cause a
change in self-esteem and dysfunctional attitudes. However, there remained the
possibility that attentional training would independently cause changes in mood.
Researchers have demonstrated, for example, that viewing emotional faces can
induce congruent moods in participants (Wild et al., 2001). If participants in the
training group attended disproportionately to negative faces, they may be more
likely to experience a negative mood. To ensure that the negative attentional
training did not induce a congruent mood state, changes in mood were assessed pre
and post training, using the PANAS. There was no significant difference between the
changes in mood seen in the control and training conditions. This^finding suggested
that attentional training had no significant effect on mood. Another possibility was
that the training condition could cause a change in both self-esteem and
dysfunctional attitudes even if it did not directly impact mood. However, the data
revealed no significant differences in self-esteem scores or dysfunctional attitudes
following the training task but prior to the stressor (see Appendix J & H). This
evidence suggests that the attentional training task alone did not cause changes in
depression relevant indices.
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After establishing that attentional training alone would not cause changes in
mood or depression indices (i.e. self-esteem and dysfunctional attitudes), the next
step was to establish if the combination of training and stressor could influence the
aforementioned indices. Changes in performance on the self-esteem and
dysfunctional attitude scales pre and post stress task were compared. The results
demonstrated that there was significantly more change in the training group than in
the control group on the SSES but not on the NLT or the dysfunctional attitude scale.
Individuals in the training group experienced a greater decrease in explicit self
esteem than did those in the control group. The results from the SSES task were
consistent what would be predicted from both the diathesis-stress model and
cognitive models of depression (Eberhart & Hammen, 2010; Monroe & Simons,
1991). Thus, changes in depression characteristics appeared to be secondary to a
combination of negative attentional training and a stressor.
Once it was established that self-esteem was affected'by attentional training,
it was possible to explore what, if any, specific domain of explicit'self-esteem was
most affected. The SSES contains three domains; performance, social, and
appearance. Analysis revealed that the social domain was the only domain
significantly affected by the attentional training task. This finding was particularly
interesting because the majority of change within each of the two groups (i.e., the
largest within-subject decrease in self-esteem) was seen in the performance domain
even though the difference between groups was most prominent in the social
domain. It is understandable that the largest within-subject difference occurred in
the performance domain because the stressor task focused on the participants’
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failure and was explicitly (although artificially] linked to their intelligence. It is
interesting, however, that the largest between-group difference in self-esteem
occurred in the social domain.
This difference in the social self-esteem domain may have been driven by the
stimuli used in the training task (i.e., pictures of faces, displaying particular
expressions]. Not only are facial expressions used to communicate emotions or
responses, they have also been linked to social information processing. For
example, individuals with social phobia avoid attending to faces (Chen, Ehlers, Clark,
& Mansell, 2002] and individuals with autism display abnormal processing of social
information from faces (Adophs, Sears, & Pivan, 2001]. Training attention towards
negative facial expressions potentially caused participants to attend to negative
interpersonal or social information during the stressor task. For example, these
participants may have been more aware of how others would disapprove of their
performance, or might have been more conscious of how othèrs would judge them
after viewing the footage of their performance. Thus, after completing the stress
\

task, participants were more sensitive or prone to identify the negative social
connotations of the task.
Schoenmaker, Wiers, Jones, Bruce, & Jansen (2007] also noted some
specificity in their attentional training research. The authors were able to train
attention away from alcoholic beverages and towards soft drinks. However, when
the researchers tested the generalizability of the trained attentional bias using
stimuli that were related but not identical to the training stimuli, the authors found
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a significantly less pronounced bias. When the types of alcohol differed from those
used in the training session participants were not as likely to attend to them. This
finding may suggest that there is a limited amount of generalizability in the stimuli
used for the training task. In contrast to Schoenmaker et al. (2007) where limited
generalizability of stimuli was documented, in the current study it was the effects of
the attentional training that demonstrated limited gerneraliability. These results
may point to a theme of limited generalizability in the attentional training paradigm
in general and may warrant further investigation.
The effect of the attentional training was only seen in self-esteem. Unlike the
SSES, the implicit measure of self-esteem (the NLT) did not reveal significant
findings, although there was a trend in the predicted direction. Further exploratory
analysis suggested that the training might have had some effect on implicit self
esteem as only the training group demonstrated a significant change in the name
letter task. However, a score of zero might not necessarily indicate that no change
in self-esteem had occurred. It is possible that scores on the NLT would improve
over time even in the absence of a training manipulation. Thus, the lack of a
significant shift on the NLT does not necessarily imply that self-esteem did not
decrease.
There are a number of reasons why this trend may not have been significant
in implicit self-esteem even though it was in explicit self-esteem. One possibility is
that only explicit self-esteem was affected. Implicit and explicit self-esteem are
related but not identical constructs (Bosson, Swann, Pennebaker, 2000) so it is
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possible that only one index could be affected. It is also possible that the NLT was
not as sensitive as was the SSES. As discussed earlier, the psychometric properties
(retest reliability, correlations with other related measures) of implicit measures of
self-esteem are not typically as strong as they are for explicit measures. The weaker
psychometric properties are likely due to the nature of the task, where greater error
variance is present (Stieger et al. 2011). Thus, under the same conditions, the NLT
may require a larger sample size than what is required for detecting significant
change in the SSES. Although implicit measures have the advantage of not being as
affected by demand characteristics as explicit measures, the decrease in face validity
also has its cost in terms of accuracy of measurement. The NLT may have revealed a
significant difference between the two groups had the research design permitted
greater statistical power.
Unlike the NLT, the DAS-SF did not show any trends in the predicted
direction. This finding may suggest that the effects of the traihing task were unlikely
to have affected dysfunctional attitudes, or that the DAS-SF is a poor measure for
\

detecting this change. The DAS-SF measures unhealthy ideas that conceptualize
oneself and the world. Once established, these ideas are often thought to remain
quite consistent. Congruent with this idea, the DAS-40 has a strong test/re-test
reliability r = .93 (Weissman & Beck, 1978). On the other hand, significant changes
on the original 40-item version of the DAS (from which the DAS-SF is derived) have
been observed during single session experiments when participants were exposed
to a negative mood prime (Fresco, Heimberg, Abramowitz, & Bertram, 2006). The
effects of mood priming have not yet been demonstrated using the DAS-SF and it is
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possible that the DAS-SF might not be as susceptible to within-session manipulation
as the 40 item DAS. Thus, it might be the case that dysfunctional attitudes, as
measured by the DAS-SF, are not particularly susceptible to change over the tenminute window between the administration of the first version, the stress task, and
the administration of the alternative version. However, it is also possible that
changes in dysfunctional attitudes would be found had attentional biases been
trained on a consistent basis over multiple sessions.
An alternative explanation is that both negative attentional biases and
dysfunctional attitudes or beliefs play a role in depression but do not significantly
interact with one another. It is also possible that negative attentional biases do not
cause changes in dysfunctional attitudes although these attitudes may still affect
attentional biases. Single session negative attentional training may also have limited
the impact relative to the bias that might occur in an individual with depression
(e.g., as a result of chronic, generalized, and repeated attentional biases). As such,
the size or generalizability of the attentional bias trained in the study may not have
been sufficient to cause changes in the DAS-SF. Thus these findings do not, however,
rule out the possibility attentional biases seen in depression are causally related to
dysfunctional attitudes.
Although the results of the DAS-SF were difficult to interpret, the findings
from this study have important clinical implications. These findings support a
causal link between attentional biases and self-esteem. Also, based on the
assumption that self-esteem is a valid indicator of depression, this study also
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indirectly implied that there may be a causal link between attentional biases and
depression, at least with respect to some of its cognitive features. This link is
theoretically important, as there has been no causal evidence linking depression
characteristics to negative attentional biases. In particular this research adds
support to the causal relationship between attentional biases and depression
theorized under a number of different cognitive theories of depression.
These findings also provide additional support for the stress diathesis model
of depression. As noted earlier, no effects on self-esteem or mood were found
immediately after the attentional training task. However, a difference was found
between groups on the SSES once a stressor was introduced. This diathesis-stress
model suggests that a combination of vulnerability and stressor are necessary for
the onset of depressive episode. Although no depressive episode was induced, the
/
findings did suggest that a combination of negative bias (vulnerability) and stressor
(anagram task) was necessary to cause changes in cognitive characteristics of
depression.

^

If attentional bias is causally related to depression, the next logical step
would be to explore the use of attentional training in treatment or potentially in
prevention. Findings from Baert et al. (2010) and Wells and Beevers (2009) both
suggest that attentional training can reduce depressive symptoms in patients with
depression or those who are likely to be depressed. This area of research requires
further investigation to delineate what type of training task will be most effective in
this population. So far, this study and those conducted by Baert et al. and Wells and
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Beevers, have all used a modified dot-probe task for the attentional training
paradigm. Other options are also possible. For example, a modified version of the
face in the crowd task, where participants search through a matrix of sad faces to
locate the happy face, may be more effective at causing changes in attention
allocation.
Exploring tasks that may have larger effect sizes and are more generalizable
will be especially useful when determining if attentional training can be used as a
preventative measure or "vaccine" against the future onset of depression. Training
vulnerable individuals to attend away from negative stimuli and towards positive
stimuli has the potential to help them respond to stress in a healthier manner and
decrease their risk of a future episode of depression. Given the simplicity of this
task, and the limited resources it requires, attention training may prove to be a
meritorious prevention strategy.
This study also revealed some information about the specificity of the
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attentional training paradigm, which may be important for its use in treatment and
prevention. The effects of the dot-probe task were specific to the type of stimuli
used; because the stimuli were of a social nature so was the effect on self-esteem.
For treatment studies, this finding may suggest that stimuli could be selected based
on the specific area in which the client experienced the greatest challenge to their
self-esteem. For example, a business executive who just lost his or her job and
experiences a negative self-view (e.g., intellectual ability, competence) may benefit
from training towards positive verbal stimuli about success, competence, and
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intelligence. The results of specificity might also suggest that if attentional training
is used for prevention, a wide range of stimuli should be used. For example, if
training towards positive social information only helps maintain social self-esteem
it would be important to train using different types of stimuli that would tap into
different domains. Developing training stimuli that span multiple domains of self
esteem may be easiest to achieve with verbal stimuli but may also be possible with
carefully selected images.
This study provides information that helps to enhance the knowledge based
in depression; however, it also has some limitations. One of the most notable
limitations is that there was no direct measure of depressive symptomatology in the
study. Although self-esteem measures correlate highly with depression measures,
and the two are theoretically linked, there depressive symptoms were not directly
measured. Measuring changes in indexes of worthlessness and helplessness may be
valuable additions to future research. Measuring changes in mood before and after
V

the stress task (instead of before and after the training task) might have provided
\

additional information. These measures were not added to the current study
because of timing concerns. For practical reasons, the study was limited to an hour
and there was not extra time available for additional measures. Also, and
potentially more importantly, there was concern that adding additional measures
post-prime might dilute the effect of both the stress task and the attentional
training. There is no available evidence to suggest how long the effects of the
negative attentional training task, in conjunction with a stressor, would last. The
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more time participants spent completing questionnaires post prime, the higher the
likelihood that the trained effects would deteriorate.
Another limitation of this study was that it was conducted in a laboratory
setting over the course of an hour. This constraint limits the applicability of the
findings to naturalistic settings and to naturally observed phenomena. Unlike biases
found in individuals with depression, these effects lasted only a short duration and
it is not known how long they might last or at what rate they could diminish. In fact,
all that is known about the longevity was established during the pilot study; these
effects, trained over one session, are unlikely to be present 24 hours later. The
majority of positive training studies have employed multiple training sessions,
allowing for the establishment of a more robust, and long-lasting effect. However,
this would be unethical to do with negative attentional training. Nevertheless, the
attention bias seen in depression is likely more robust and, as discussed earlier,
more generalizable than the bias trained during this experiment. Although the bias
trained resembles that seen in depression in both temporal size and time of onset, it
\

may still not be identical to the bias normally observed in depression, and for this
reason, limited generalizations can be drawn from these results. Although the
biases are similar in a number of important aspects, it is not possible to conclude
they are identical and thus one must be circumspect when drawing conclusions
about the effects of the true bias demonstrated in depression from the findings that
were based on the trained in this study.
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In addition, in this study participants were only trained to attend to negative

information but were not trained to attend away from positive stimuli. Thus,
neutral and negative faces were used as stimuli instead of positive and negative
images. This decision was made to ensure that the results were due to attending
towards negative images and not to attending away from positive ones. Thus, the
results of the study were specific to biases related to attending towards negative
information and not confounded by the results of attending away from positive
information. However, this type of bias is not.identical to that seen in depression.
Individuals with depression seem to both attend towards negative and away from
positive information (Ingram, Steidtmann, & Bistricky, 2008). Some researchers
suggest that patients with more severe or diagnosable depression demonstrate an
attentional bias towards negative information whereas those individuals with
moderate depression only attend away from positive information (Ingram, et al.,
2008). In future studies it might be informative to use positive instead of neutral
faces, which would both train participants to attend way from positive information
and towards negative information.
In addition to modifying the training stimuli, it may be information to modify
the stressor task. As noted earlier, the stressor task was mainly performance-based
and the largest within-group changes in self-esteem were observed in the
performance domain of the SSES. However, the groups most significantly differed
from one another on the social domain of the SSES. Therefore, larger effects might
be observed if the stressor was most consistent with the type of stimuli used. For
example, a social stressor used along with social stimuli may amplify the differences

between groups because the stressor and training task both focus on the same
- domain of self-esteem. It would also be possible to modify the training stimuli to be
more in line with the stressor task. Performance based verbal or pictorial stimuli
could be used in the training task long with the anagram stressor task to establish if
a larger between-group difference could be created in the performance domain.
It will be important for future research to replicate these findings. The
results of this study, however, also suggest additional, novel questions. One
question that this research introduces is whether and to what extent does an
attentional bias generalize to different types of information? The current study did
not explore whether the trained bias for negative faces generalized to faces not used
during training or to other types of valenced information. Wadlinger and Isaacowitz
(2008] found that training a positive attention bias could affect the way individuals
attended to unrelated negative stimuli. Schoenmaker et al. (2007] found that the
degree of bias was significantly reduced when stimuli that we're novel, but of the
f

same nature as the training stimuli (images of alcohol], were usecb This issue will
be an important one to address if attentional training research is to be adapted for
use in prevention or treatment. As mentioned earlier if attentional training is to be
used in prevention it is important that the stimuli be as generalizable as possible.
Exploring whether it is necessary to use multiple types of stimuli may be
informative in planning future prevention study methodology.
Wells and Beevers (2010] and B aertetal. (2010] have explored the use of
attentional training to reduce depressive symptoms; however, these researchers did
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not directly investigate how positive attentional training affects stress response. The
findings from the current studies suggest that attentional training interacts with a
stressor to cause cognitive changes in depression characteristics. Future work
could either investigate this area in an experimental setting over a single session
trial as was conducted here or in a more naturalistic setting as was conducted in
Dandeneau et al. (2007) with telemarketers and See et al. (2009) with individuals
who were moving out of the country. This research will be important not only to
investigate whether positive attentional training can improve stress response in
clinical populations but also to establish if it could produce similar positive effects in
the general population as suggested by Dandeneau et al. (2007).
Hopefully the attentional training research in the area of depression will
progress to a point where it may be useful in prevention and treatment. The current
study has provided important information about the role of negative attentional
bias in depression. This research has also highlighted questions about the
generalizability of the training stimuli, as well as provided evidence concerning the
interaction between stress and attentional bias. It will be important to improve our
current understanding of the effectiveness of training paradigms and the role that
attentional bias plays in perpetuating the symptoms of depression.
In the pilot study, the ethical implications of negative attentional training
were evaluated and it was determined that it was unlikely that the training affects
from a single session would last longer than 24 hours. In Study 1, an attentional bias
consistent with that seen in depression was trained and the temporal size of such an
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effect was similar to that has been found in the anxiety literature. The study also
revealed that the attentional training, in conjunction with stress could cause
changes in self-esteem, a measure related to depression. In particular a significant
effect was found on the explicit measure of self-esteem and the means trended in
the hypothesized direction on the implicit measure. Changes in explicit self-esteem
were content-specific. These findings give some of the first causal evidence for the
relationship between attentional biases and depression as well as developing our
understanding of the role that attentional biases can play in the onset and
maintenance of depression. This work will hopefully prompt more research in this
area allowing for a better understanding of the role of attentional bias in depression
and later how attentional training may be useful in the prevention and treatment of
this debilitating disorder.

V
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Appendix A: Letter of Information from Pilot Study

Letter o f Information - Attentional Allocation Study.
Dr. David Dozois and Rebecca McDermott
Department of Psychology,
University o f Western Ontario
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Rebecca
McDermott and supervised by Dr. David Dozois. This experiment will span over two
days, and you will be asked to complete an hour on both days. During these two
hours you will be asked to complete a number of tasks. You will be asked to
complete a number of questionnaires, which will ask you questions about your
personal experiences, feelings, and emotions. These questions are not meant to be
invasive, and if you do not feel comfortable answering any question please leave it
blank. You will also be asked to complete a computer task in which you will respond
to a probe (identifying whether there are one or two asterix) as quickly and as
accurately as possible. You will also read a number of scenarios and then later you
will be given a memory task.
There should be no long-term harmful effects from these studies. The most
substantial risk from this study is a negative effect on mood. All evidence suggests
that these effects, if present, will be transient, but if negative mood persists please
contact us and/or use the resources listed in the debriefing sheet. There are no
other known risks to this study. There is no direct benefit to the participant for
participating in this study. You will be compensated financially (at a rate of 10$ an
hour) for participating in this study. You will be given the total amount after your
second visit but if you do not complete the second visit you are stifyentitled to
payment for the time you have spend. It will be up to you to contact us for this
compensation. If you leave at any point during a session you are entitled to
compensation for that session. If you leave during the first session you will receive
10 dollars if you leave during the second session you will receive 20 dollars.
If for any reason, you wish to withdraw from the experiment, you may do so
at any time during the experiment. You will still receive compensation for the time
you have spent. You may also remove your data from the study for any reason,
before analysis is performed, without any consequences. Confidentiality will be
respected. All data will be used strictly for experimental purposes, and will only be
available to researchers directly involved in the project. The data will be stored
securely and your individual data will never be released or published without your
permission, or as required by law. Your data will otherwise be destroyed five years
after publication.
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Psychology
Research Ethics Board. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject,
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you should contact the Director of the Office of Research Ethics at ethics(5)uwo.ca or
661-3036.
Rebecca McDermott, B.Sc.., M.Sc. Candidate in Clinical Psychology
Email: XXXXXXX@XXXX
Advisor: Dr. David Dozois
Email: XXXXXXX@XXXX

' , :
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Appendix B: Consent Form from Pilot Study.

Consent Form - Attentional Allocation Study
Dr. David Dozois and Rebecca McDermott
Department of Psychology,
University of Western Ontario
To participate in the Attentional Allocation Study, please sign the consent statement
bellow.
1have read the letter of information and the nature of the study has been sufficiently
explained to me. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I
agree to participate in this study.
Participants Signature (x)
Date ______ /:____ / ■ ■■■■■ (DD/MM/YYYY)
Experimenter’s Signature (x)
Date

(DD/MM/YYYY)
\
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Appendix C: Debriefing Form from Pilot Study.

Western

Debriefing Sheet - Attentional Allocation Study

Dr. David Dozois and Rebecca McDermott
Department of Psychology,
University of Western Ontario

There were a number of goals in running this study. The main goal was to ,
assess if we could train a negative attentional bias. Research in depression has
demonstrated that depressed individuals demonstrate negative attentional biases
(they spend more time paying attention to negative information than neutral or
positive information). Cognitive theories of depression postulate that these
negative attentional biases are causal factors in the onset and maintenance of
depression (Beck, 1967; Teasdale, 1988). Although this causal link is widely
theorized there is no direct evidence for it. Research in anxiety using the dot-probe
task has found that attentional biases can be trained and cause temporary increases
in susceptibility to anxiety (Mathew &MacLeod, 2002). Our current study's aim is to
establish if these negative attentional biases can be trained similar to those seen in
depression. These biases are intended to be transient and notlast much longer than
the duration of the study.
; • •
V
To do this we used the dot-probe task. This is the task you did on the
computer in which you saw people’s faces and then you had to decide if there were
one or two asterisks. You were either placed in the training or the non-training
condition. In the training condition the asterisks (probes) were located behind the
sad face 80% of the time. In the non-training condition the probe was just as likely
to appear behind the neutral face as the sad face. In this task we hypothesize that
the training group will begin to spend more time paying attention to the negative
faces, which would make them faster at the task.
All the questionnaires you filled out during the experiment were to assess if
the training had an effect on mood, negative thinking, or level of depression. We do
not expect any significant changes in mood or level of depression but if any were to
occur they would most likely be transient. You also filled out two scales of a
depression measure to see if you were eligible for the study. This internet survey
was conducted to ensure that we did not place individuals high in depression or
anxiety symptoms into the study. This was done for two reasons, we did not want to
intensify already low moods and also as negative attentional biases are already
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present in this population it would make less sense to train a negative attentional
bias in this group.
The second task you completed was an interpretive bias task. Not only do
depressed individuals pay more attention to negative information but they are also
more likely to interpret ambiguous scenarios in a negative manner. In addition to
assessing whether we could train a negative attentional bias we were also
interested in determining if this bias generalized to an interpretive bias. In this task
you read a number of scenarios and then later we asked you to rate a number of
statements on how closely they matched the original scenario. If the attentional
biases generalize to negative interpretive biases then individuals in the training
group would be more likely to endorse the negative interpretations.
All of the data that you provided for this study is kept strictly confidential,
and the results will only be presented openly in terms of group data (i.e., thesis
defense, conferences presentations, articles). All data will be kept in a secured area.
If you have any other questions regarding the experiment, please do not hesitate to
contact me (Rebecca McDermott).
Participants dealing with problematic mood (e.g., persistent sad mood) and/
or suicidal thinking are strongly encouraged to speak with a mental health
professional. For example, students at UWO are offered free psychological
counseling at the Student Development Centre. You may also speak directly with Dr.
David Dozois (XXX-XXX-XXXX, ext. XXXXX; XXXXXXX@XXXX1 Other resources and
self-help references are provided below.

Rebecca McDermott, B.Sc.., M.Sc. Candidate in Clinical Psychology
Email: XXXXXXX@XXXX

V

Advisor: Dr. David Dozois
Email: XXXXXXX@XXXX

If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you should contact the
Director of the Office of Research Ethics at ethics@uwo.ca or 661-3036.

References
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' Medical Division, Harper & Row.
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (2002). Induced processing biases have causal effects on
anxiety. Cognition & Emotion, 16, 331-354.
Teasdale, J. D. (1988). Cognitive vulnerability to persistent depression. Cognition &
Emotion, 2, 247-274.
Self-Help References:
If you would like to look up some good self-help books on changing negative
thinking, please see:
•
•
•

Burns, D. D. (1980). Feeling good. New York: Penguin.
Burns, D. D. (1989).The feeling good handbook. New York: Penguin.
Greenberger, D ., & Padesky, C. A . (1995). Mind over mood: Change the way you feel
by changing the way you think. Guilford Press.
Services Available to Students

There are several ways in which students can access psychological or psychiatric
help both on campus and within the City of London, Ontario. If you are feeling
depressed or anxious or feel that you could benefit from some individual assistance,
the following information may be of use to you.

The Student Development Centre at the University of Western^pntario
Individual counselling and crisis appointments are available for UW O students.
To make an appointment you can call 661-3031, or you can make an appointment
in person at the Reception Desk, Room 235 located within SDC, University

Community Centre Room 210.
More information about the services offered at SD C can be found at
htti)://www.sdc.uwo.ca/
;^
Student Health Services Counselling Centre
The Student Health Services Counselling Centre provides individual counselling
for students.
The Counselling Centre can be reached at (519) 661-3771 and is located in Room

11, (Lower Level) University Community Centre
The Counselling Centre is open Monday to Friday 8:30 a.m. - 4:30 p.m, and will
be closed whenever the University is closed.
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More information about the Counselling Centre can be found at
http://vvww.shs.mvo.ca/counselling/indcx.htm
London & District Distress Centre
This is a 24-hour Distress Help Line: (519) 667-6711.
Each problem is handled in an atmosphere o f confidentiality, anonymity &
impartiality. You do not have to give your name nor does the service use call
display; they will not try to identify the caller.
London Mental Health Crisis Service
24-hour Crisis Help Line: (519) 433-2023
Walk-in help is available at the Crisis Centre at 862 Richmond Street, London
Hours o f operation are Monday to Friday - 2 p.m. to 10 p.m.; Saturday, Sunday
and Holidays - 6 p.m. to 9 p.m.

Addiction Services o f Thames Valley
Addiction Services of Thames Valley is located at 200-256 Pall Mall Sreet,
London and can be contacted at (519) 673-3242 ext. 222 or

kmeyer@adstv.on.ca

i

Service is available to any resident o f Middlesex, Elgin or Oxford County.
Provide support to persons who are concerned about substance use and/or
problem gambling.
Hours of operation in London are Monday to Friday -8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m
(closed 12 until 1 p.m. each day).
\

)
Emergencies After Hours

• '

If you are in distress during an after-hours time, please go to the nearest hospital

emergency room.
On Campus: University Hospital: (519) 663- 3197, 339 Windemere Road
South London: Victoria Hospital: (519) 685-8500, 800 Commissioners Road
East

North London: St. Joseph's Hospital: (519) 646- 6100, 268 Grosvenor Road
Referrals to Other Resources
Family physicians can provide you with counselling services, and can make
referrals to other community resources as needed.
Specialized services for emotional and interpersonal problems are available,
however, a referral from a physician is often necessary.
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W e hope that this inform ation is helpful to those who need it.
I f y o u are suffering fr o m distress, we encourage y o u to seek help fr o m an appropriately
qualified individual or service centre. Please contact a University or Com m unity A gen cy that
can help y o u , o r to speak with a physician who can refer y o u to the appropriate agency

\
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Appendix D: Name Letter Task.
The Name Letter Task
Please rank each of the letters bellow on a scale of 1-7 on how much you like
that letter with 1 being "Not Like” and 7 being "Like A lot”. These ratings are
subjective and there is no right or wrong answer. Please do not spend too much
time on any one question; your first instinct is normally most accurate on this task.

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J

K
L

Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2

Like A lot
3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4 .

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7

N

Like A lot
3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7

M

N

0

P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W

Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2

Y

Z

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

Not Like
1 2

3

Not Like
1
2

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

Not Like
1 2

3

Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

Not Like
1 2

3

Not Like
1
2

4

5

6

7

2

Not Like
1
2
Not Like
1
2
Not Like

1 2

'

Like A lot
3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

Not Like

1
X

Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

3

3

4

5

6

7
Like A lot

4

5

6

7
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Appendix E: Stimuli from Anagram Task.
1.00

Not Solvable:

OLWGFNA

2.00

Solvable:

EOTSBT

3.00

Solvable:

EMSTKI

4.00

Not Solvable: KDN1TE

5.00

Not Solvable: VDAOCO

6.00

Not Solvable: GE1DLH

7.00

Not Solvable: ALLRGON

8.00

Not Solvable: NERRDED

9.00

Not Solvable: UTAFIE

10.00 Not Solvable: DNOE1G
11.00 Not Solvable: EYEHLK
12.00 Not Solvable: COMEPR
13.00 Not Solvable: TRLEEBEA
14.00 Not Solvable: ICIRMOSCC
15.00 Not Solvable: A1NNTRTSO
16.00 Solvable:

TAENSIG

17.00 Not Solvable: OFFC11TECN
18.00 Solvable:

ACLADIR

19.00 Solvable:

SIAAVEBR

20.00 Solvable:

R1SECET

21.00 Not Solvable: GELTAER
22.00 Solvable:

PPSORALO

23.00 Solvable:

TRNTHEGS

24.00 Solvable:

OSLURDEH

25.00 Solvable:

NIACUSEOT

26.00 Solvable:

1TWHEG

27.00 Solvable:

RNTEESA

28.00 Not Solvable: NROWEUT
29.00 Solvable:

TYIHEASR

30.00 Solvable:

OIRUPMTPM

31.00 Solvable:

TAHEREN

32.00 Not Solvable: AESIDUD
33.00 Solvable:

ACANSETIF

34.00 Solvable:

SNGDIE

35.00 Not Solvable: APCERETG
36.00 Solvable:

VETIIFUG

37.00 Not Solvable: TASRAPI
38.00 Solvable:

THGRUOH

39.00 Not Solvable: IUTRUCE
40.00 Solvable:

CEENRYEGM
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Appendix F: Letter of Information from Study 1.

IT!
!u

Western

Letter o f Information - Attentional Allocation Study
Dr. David Dozois and Rebecca McDermott
Department of Psychology,
University of Western Ontario

You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Rebecca
McDermott and supervised by Dr. David Dozois. This experiment will span over two
days, and you will be asked to complete an hour on both days. During these two
hours you will be asked to complete a number of tasks. You will be asked to
complete a number of questionnaires, which will ask you questions about your
personal experiences, feelings, and emotions. These questions are not meant to be
invasive, and if you do not feel comfortable answering any of the questions please
leave it blank. You will also be asked to complete a computer task in which you will
be asked to respond to a probe (identifying whether there are one or two asterix] as
quickly and as accurately as possible. You will also read a number of scenarios and
then later you will be given a memory task.
There should be no long-term harm from these studies. The most substantial
risk from this study is a negative effect on mood. All evidence suggests that these
effects, if present, will be transient, but if negative mood persists please contact us
and/or use the resources listed below. There are no other known risks to this study.
There is no direct benefit to the participant for participating in thjs study. You will
be compensated financially (at a rate of 10$ an hour] for participating in this study1.
You will be given the total amount after your second visit but if you do not complete
the second visit you are still entitled to payment for the time you have spend. It will
be up to you to contact us for this compensation.
If for any reason, you wish to withdraw from the experiment, you may do so
at any time, without consequence. You may also remove your data from the study
for any reason, before analysis is performed, without any consequences.
Confidentiality will be respected. All data will be used strictly for experimental
purposes, and will only be available to researchers directly involved in the project.
The data will be stored securely and your individual data will never be released or
published without your permission, or as required by law. Your data will otherwise
be destroyed five years after publication.

1 T h is s e n te n c e w a s m o d if ie d in th e v e r s io n g i v e n to in tr o d u c to r y p s y c h o l o g y p a r tic ip a n ts a n d it r e a d , “ Y o u
w ill b e c o m p e n s a t e d w ith o n e r e s e a r c h c r e d it in P s y c h o lo g y 1000 fo r p a r t ic ip a t in g in th is s tu d y ” .
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This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Psychology
Research Ethics Board. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject,
you should contact the Director of the Office of Research Ethics at ethics@uwo.ca or
661-3036.
Rebecca McDermott, B.Sc.., M.Sc. Candidate in Clinical Psychology
Email: XXXXXXX@XXXX
Advisor: Dr. David Dozois
Email: XXXXXXX@XXXX

V
v
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Appendix G: Consent Form from Study 1.
Consent Form - Attentional Allocation Study
Dr. David Dozois and Rebecca McDermott
Department of Psychology,
University o f Western Ontario
To participate in the Attentional Allocation Study, please sign the consent statement
bellow.
I have read the letter of information and the nature of the study has been sufficiently
explained to me. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I
agree to participate in this study.
Participants Signature (x)
Date______ /______ /_______ (DD/MM/YYYY)
Experimenter's Signature (x]
D ate______/______ /_______ (DD/MM/YYYY)
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Appendix H; Debriefing Form from Study 1.

Debriefing Sheet - Attention to Emotional Faces

Dr. David Dozois and Rebecca McDermott
Department of Psychology,
University of Western Ontario

j
The main goal in running this study was to assess how modifying attentional
bias could affect vulnerability to depression. Research in depression has
demonstrated that depressed individuals demonstrate negative attentional biases
(they spend more time paying attention to negative information than neutral or
positive information). Cognitive theories of depression postulate that these
negative attentional biases are causal factors in the onset and maintenance of
depression (Beck, 1967; Teasdale, 1988). Although this causal link is widely
theorized, there is no direct evidence of it. Research in anxiety using the dot-probe
task has found that attentional biases can be trained and cause temporary increases
in susceptibility to anxiety (Mathew &MacLeod, 2002). Research has also
demonstrated that individuals who show heightened vulnerability to depression or
anxiety may benefit from positive attentional training (see, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009;
Wells &Beavers, 2009). Our current study's aim is to establish if these negative and
positive attentional biases can be trained and whether they will affect vulnerability
to depression.
To do this we used the dot-probe task. This is the task you did on the
computer in which you saw people’s faces and then you had to decide if there were
one or two asterisks were displayed. You were either placed in to one of four
conditions based your score on a depression instrument and random allocation. If
your score indicated that you might be experiencing some symptoms of depression
you were randomly allocated to either the positive training group or its comparable
control group. If your score suggested that you had few depressive symptoms we
placed you in the negative attentional training group or its comparable control
group.
In the training conditions, the asterisks (probes) were located behind the sad
or happy faces 80% of the time. In the non-training condition the probe was just as
likely to appear behind the neutral face as the sad or happy face. In this task we
hypothesize that the training group will begin to spend more time paying attention
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to the negative or positive faces, which would make them faster at the task. We also
gave you measure of positive and negative mood before and after this task to assess
if the training caused any changes in mood. We hypothesize that no such changes
will occur.
The next step in our experiment was to assess the impact that the attentional
training had on vulnerability to depression. It is hypothesized that the dot-probe
would not affect your mood or self-image directly but instead would affect your
response to a stressful event. In order to test this hypothesis we gave you the same
series of measures before and after a stress induction task. The measures (The
Name Letter Task, The State Self-Esteem Scale, and The Dysfunctional Attitude
Scale) measured implicit and explicit self-esteem as well as attitudes consistent with
depression. For the stress induction task we asked you to solve a series of anagrams
under time pressure. These anagrams were designed to be very difficult or
impossible to solve. This created a stressful situation for you as you would have
been unable to solve most if not all of the anagrams and you may have thought that
this was due to your ability and not the question's difficulty.
We also added an additional level of stress by telling you that you would be
video taped and that the best and the worst performances would be later shown to
others. We then told you that we were selecting your video. On both of these counts
you were deceived. We were not video taping you, and all participants were told we
were using their footage regardless of their performance. We used this form of
deception to elevate the level of stress that you experienced during this task.
Because of the use of deception, you have the right to refuse the use of your data for
this study. If you consent to the use of your data for this study, please sign the
attached consent form.
After the stress induction task you completed the same measures as before
the task. We hypothesize that although all groups will be negatively affected by this
mood induction the negative attentional training group will be the most affected and
the positive attentional training group will be the least affected compared to their
respective control groups.
, All of the data that you provided for this study is kept strictly confidential,
and the results will only be presented openly in terms of group data (i.e., thesis
defense, conferences presentations, peer-reviewed publications). All data will be
kept in a secured area. If you have any other questions regarding the experiment,
please do not hesitate to contact me (Rebecca McDermott).
Participants dealing with problematic mood (e.g., persistent sad mood) and/
or suicidal thinking are strongly encouraged to speak with a mental health
professional. For example, students at UWO are offered free psychological
counseling at the Student Development Centre. You may also speak directly with Dr.
David Dozois (XXX-XXX-XXXX, ext. XXXXX: XXXXXXX@XXXX). Other resources and
self-help references are provided below.

91

Rebecca McDermott, B.Sc., M.Sc. Candidate in Clinical Psychology
Email: XXXXXXX@XXXX

Advisor: Dr. David Dozois
Email: XXXXXXX@XXXX

If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you should contact the
Director of the Office of Research Ethics at ethics(5>uwo.ca or 661-3036.

References

Beck, A. T. (1967]. Depression: Clinical experimental, and theoretical aspects Hoeber
Medical Division, Harper & Row.
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (2002). Induced processing biases have causal effects on
anxiety. Cognition & Emotion, 16, 331-354.
Teasdale, J. D. (1988). Cognitive vulnerability to persistent depression. Cognition &
Emotion, 2, 247-274.
Self-Help References:

^

If you would like to look up some good self-help books on changing negative
thinking, please see:•
•
•
•

Bums, D . D . (1980). Feeling good. New York: Penguin.
Bums, D. D. (1989). The feeling good handbook. New York: Penguin.
Greenberger, D ., & Padesky, C . A . (1995). Mind over mood: Change the way you feel
by changing the way you think. Guilford Press.
Services Available to Students

There are several ways in which students can access psychological or psychiatric
help both on campus and within the City of London, Ontario. If you are feeling
depressed or anxious or feel that you could benefit from some individual assistance,
the following information may be of use to you.
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The Student Development Centre at the University of Western Ontario
Individual counselling and crisis appointments are available for UW O students.
To make an appointment you can call 661-3031, or you can make an appointment
in person at the Reception Desk, Room 235 located within SDC, University
Community Centre Room 210.
More information about the services offered at SD C can be found at

http://www.sdc.uwo.ca/
Student Health Services Counselling Centre
The Student Health Services Counselling Centre provides individual counselling
for students.
The Counselling Centre can be reached at (519) 661-3771 and is located in Room

11, (Lower Level) University Community Centre
The Counselling Centre is open Monday to Friday 8:30 a.m. - 4:30 p.m, and will
be closed whenever the University is closed.
More information about the Counselling Centre can be found at

littp://www.shs.uwo.ca/counselling/indcx.htm
London & District Distress Centre
•

This is a 24-hour Distress Help Line: (519) 667-6711.
Each problem is handled in an atmosphere o f confidentiality, anonymity &
impartiality. You do not have to give your name nor does the service use call
display; they will not try to identify the caller.
\

London Mental Health Crisis Service
24-hour Crisis Help Line: (519) 433-2023
Walk-in help is available at the Crisis Centre at 862 Richmond Street, London
Hours o f operation are Monday to Friday - 2 p.m. to 10 p.m.; Saturday, Sunday
and Holidays - 6 p.m. to 9 p.m.

Addiction Services of Thames Valley
Addiction Services of Thames Valley is located at 200-256 Pall Mall Sreet,
. London and can be contacted at (519) 673-3242 ext. 222 or
kmeyer@adstv.on.ca
Service is available to any resident of Middlesex, Elgin or Oxford County.
Provide support to persons who are concerned about substance use and/or
problem gambling.
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Hours of operation in London are Monday to Friday - 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m
(closed 12 until 1 p.m. each day).
Emergencies After Hours
If you are in distress during an after-hours time, please go to the nearest hospital

emergency room.
On Campus: University Hospital: (519) 663- 3197, 339 Windemere Road
South London: Victoria Hospital: (519) 685-8500, 800 Commissioners Road
East

North London: St. Joseph's Hospital: (519) 646- 6100, 268 Grosvenor Road
Referrals to Other Resources
Family physicians can provide you with counselling services, and can make
referrals to other community resources as needed.
Specialized services for emotional and interpersonal problems are available,
, however, a referral from a physician is often necessary.

We hope that this inform ation is helpful to those who need it.
I f y o u are suffering fr o m distress, we encourage y o u to seek help fr o m an appropriately
qualified individual o r service centre. Please contact a University o r Com m unity A gen cy that
can help y o u , o r to speak with a physician who can refer y o u to the appropriate agency

V

Appendix I: Final Consent Form from Study 1.
Consent Form - Attentional to Emotional Faces

Dr. David Dozois and Rebecca McDermott
Department of Psychology,
University of Western Ontario
To participate in the Attention to Emotional Faces Study, please sign the consent
statement bellow.

I have been informed o f the deception that occurred during this experiment and
understand why it was used. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction,
and I agree for my data to be used in this study.

Participants Name

Participants Signature (x)
____________________________________________________________ Date________ /________ /
(DD/M M/YYYY)
'
Experimenters Name

\

Experimenters Signature (x)
Date
(DD/M M/YYYY)

/

/
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Appendix J: Comparison of training and control group post training but pre-stress
task.

Means o f measures given pre and post stress task._____________ __________________________________

Pre Stress Task
Mean Control
Condition

,

Post Stress Task

Mean Training
Condition

Mean Control
Condition

Mean Training
Condition

69.94(11.39)

72.93 (10.55)

67.61 (13.40)

67.07 (14.01)

Performance

24.65 (4.49)

26.56 (4.67)

23.19(5.72)

22.87 (5.54)

Social

24.07(5.33)

26.00 (5.11)

24.29 (5.79)

24.46 (6.22)

Appearance

20.22 (4.39)

20.37 (4.00)

20.13 (4.27)

19.74 (4.48)

NLT

-2.92(1.07)

-2.89(1.18)

-2.87(0.97)

-2.63(1.12)

D AS-SF

19.85 (3.38)

18.69(4.05)

19.61 (4.47)

19.60(4.21)

SSES

Note. N L T = Name Letter Task, SSES = State Self-Esteem Scale, and^DAS-SF =
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale-Short Form
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Appendix K: ANOVAs conducted on measures given
F- scores and P-values for 2x2 mixed ANOVAS on measures given._______
F

—

SSES
_ Pre/post stress

26.35

.001*

Condition

0.10 .

.75

Interaction

4.02

.04*

Pre/post stress

0.06

.18

Condition

2.60

.08

Interaction

2.19

.12

Performance

Social
Pre/post stress

0.03

.87
\

Condition

2.43

Interaction

20.45

.09

V

.04*
'V

Appearance
Pre/post stress
Condition
Interaction

0.11

.74

, 0.05

.96

0.65

.52

NLT
Pre/post stress
Condition

11.83

.oo r

2.04

.16
?

Interaction

1.46

.23

Pre/post stress

0.01

.91

Condition

0.07

.80

Interaction

1.68

D AS-SF

.20

Note. NLT = Name Letter Task, SSES = State Self-Esteem Scale, and D AS-SF =
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale-Short Form.
* Indicates significance.
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Appendix L: Ethics Approval for Pilot Study

Department of Psychology

The University of Western Ontario
Room 7418 Social Scien ces Centre,
London, ON, Canada N6A 5C1
Telephone: (519)661-2067
Fax:(519)661-3961

of Human Subjects - Ethics Approval Notice
R e v ie w N u m b e r

P rin c ip a l In v e s tig a to r
P r o to c o l T itle
Sponsor

10 07 04

A p p ro v a l
D a te

D av id D o zo is/R e b e cca M cD erm o tt

E n d D a te

1007

22

1009

15

A tte n tio n a l allo catio n
n/a

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Department of Psychology Research Ethics Board
(PREB) has granted expedited ethics approval to the above named research study on the date noted above.
The PREB is a sub-REB of The University of Western Ontario's Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement
and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario. (See Office of Research Ethics web site:
http://www.uwo.ca/research/ethics)
This approval shall remain valid until end date noted above assuming timely and acceptable
responses to the University's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information.
During the course of the research, no deviations from, or changes to, the protocol or consent form may be initiated
without prior written approval from the PREB except when necessary to eliminate immediate hazards to the subject or
when the change(s) involve only logistical or administrative aspects of the study (e.g. change of research assistant,
telephone number etc). Subjects must receive a copy of the information/consent documentation.

Investigators must promptly also report to the PREB
a} changes increasing the risk to the participantes] and/or affecting significantly
the conduct of the study: b) all adverse and unexpected experiences or events that
are both serious and unexpected: c] new information that may adversely affect the
safety of the subjects or the conduct of the study.
If these changes/adverse events require a change to the information/consent documentation, and or recruitment
advertisement, the newly revised information/consent documentation, and/or advertisement, must be submitted to
the PREB for approval.
o
Members of the PREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do
not participate in discussion related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the PREB.

Clive Seligman Ph.D.
Chair, Psychology Expedited Research Ethics Board (PREB)

99

Appendix M: Ethics Approval from Study 1

Department of Psychology

The University of Western Ontario
Room 7418 Social Scien ce s Centre,
London, ON, Canada N6A 5C1
Telephone: (519) 661-2067
Fax: (519) 661-3961

Use of Human Subjects - Ethics Approval Notice
A p p r o v a l D a te
R e v ie w N u m b e r

P rin c ip a l In v e s tig a to r
P r o to c o l T itle
Sponsor

101004

10 10 05

D av id D ozois

I I 0430
E n d D ate

A tte n tio n to em o tio n a l faces
n/a

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Department of Psychology Research Ethics Board
(PREB) has granted expedited ethics approval to the above named research study on the date noted above.
The PREB is a sub-REB of The University of Western Ontario's Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement
and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario. (See Office of Research Ethics web site:
http://www.uwo.ca/research/ethics )
This approval shall remain valid until end date noted above assuming timely and acceptable
responses to the University's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information.
‘x

■

During the course of the research, no deviations from, or changes to, the protocol or consent form may be initiated
without prior written approval from the PREB except when necessary to eliminate immediate ^azards to the subject or
when the change(s) involve only logistical or administrative aspects of the study (e.g. change of research assistant,
telephone number etc). Subjects must receive a copy of the information/consent documentation.
v
Investigators must promptly also report to the PREB:
a) changes increasing the risk to the participant(s) and/or affecting significantly
the conduct of the study: b) all adverse and unexpected experiences or events that
are both serious and unexpected: c) new information that may adversely affect the
safety of the subjects or the conduct of the study.
If these changes/adverse events require a change to the information/consent documentation, and or recruitment
advertisement, the newly revised information/consent documentation, and/or advertisement, must be submitted to
the PREB for approval.
Members of the PREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do
not participate in discussion related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the PREB.

Clive Seligman Ph.D.
Chair. Psychology Exoedited Research Ethics Board fPREBl

